CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Since much of the research on C&S is in Afrikaans, a language not familiar to most English speakers, this review will use many translated quotations to open up the literature to them.

This review will analyze works of scholars from three perspectives. (1) The exclusivist thinkers or ethnic theologians, who defend much of HRLS while criticizing the direction that the NGK is moving. Their works are positive toward some aspects of ethnic and/or racial exclusivity in church and civil government, though not necessarily every aspect. (2) The second group are the sphere sovereignty thinkers. These critics are from within the more orthodox NGK circles but would not wish to defend ethnically exclusive churches or a social order based upon language or culture. (3) The last group are the inclusivist theologians who support ethno-racial inclusivity in church and political life.

The analysis of C&S by members of the three groups will follow the research questions in order: (1) View of Scriptural authority. (2) Eschatological viewpoint. (3) Understanding of the Trinitarian paradigm. (4) Understanding of the covenant. (5) View of Universal Equity.

Biblical Authority Versus Church Authority

As seen in first chapter, several have acknowledged that the NGK’s perspective on Scripture has dramatically shifted in the period between the writing of HRLS and C&S (see Kreitzer 1997). It is sufficient to note here that the Barthian emphasis upon the fallible "humanity" of Scripture results in a reduction of biblical authority. This, in turn, rejects a literal creation, and allegedly seems to have had far-reaching implications for NGK social theology and social ethics (see [S.A.] Strauss 1987, [P. J.] Strauss 1988, 1992; Potgieter 1990).

A further alleged consequence of such reduction of authority effects church authority. Thus, for example, Strauss argues that C&S 1990 reserves for church officers the "exclusive" and "specialist task" of handling the Word. This excludes specialists in other social spheres from authoritatively using the Word in their terrain. The re-creation and its re-creating word cannot work directly in the other social spheres but must be "mediated through the church" [as institution] (Strauss 1992, 948). If this is true, the principle of sola Scriptura, basic to the Reformation, is replaced with ecclesiastical authority, a situation analogous to pre-Reformation times.

Sola Scriptura in HRLS and C&S

In contrast, John De Gruchy, Professor of Christian Studies at UCT, states that HRLS was "not fundamentalist in its approach to Scripture, though it is generally very conservative" especially in that it takes seriously the cultural relevance "of the creation narratives and the proto-history of Genesis 1-11" (De Gruchy 1986, 71). De Gruchy further claims that most in the Reformed tradition would not object to the "hermeneutical principles" in HRLS which relate to "not only how the Bible is to be interpreted but also how it is to be related to society" (De Gruchy 1986, 71). Thus, according to De Gruchy, HRLS was in continuity with the classic Reformed doctrine of Scripture.

NGSK theologian, Jaap Durand, has a different perspective. He claims that the HRLS had a "very biblicistic approach to the Bible in which little respect for context or historical situation is shown" (Durand 1985, 42).

The difference between these two assessments seems to be that Durand, influenced by dialecticism and higher criticism, has more consequently accepted the paradigm shift in the doctrine of Scripture pioneered by Barth. Hence, he rejects HRLS’ "very conservative approach" to, for example, the proto-history as a fundamentalist, biblicism which does not take into account the pre-scientific context of Scripture.

Moving to C&S, conservative NGK theologian, S. A. Strauss, also claims that it is biblicistic. His critique is not based upon the human fallibility of Scripture but, following Calvin, that Scripture is the "only glasses" with which we can and must read and interpret all of life (Strauss 1987, 5). Thus, he claims, C&S "bends the Reformational sola Scriptura into a non-reformed form of biblicism" (Strauss 1987, 4), because it refuses to allow legitimate deductions (bona consequentia) to be made from all relevant Scripture in several crucial areas.

The reason for this reductionist, almost sectarian, biblicism, he writes, is that C&S "concentrates on the divine word of redemption and recreation [in the Bible] at the expense of the word of creation and providence." (Strauss 1987, 19; see also Strauss 1987, 5). Furthermore, he sees the source of this rejection of the creation and proto-history to be pre-War German dialectical theology. The Barmen Declaration, stemming from a movement heavily influenced by Barth, is a good example.

Therefore, implicitly, Strauss alleges that reducing the authority of Scripture in any way is itself a true form of biblicism as defined in the classic Reformed sense of the word.

With an ad hominem argument, UNISA theologian, N. S. Kritzinger, rejects Strauss’ claim that C&S’ possesses an "anthropocentric reduction" of Scriptural authority." Strauss, Kritzinger claims, is part of the ethnic-centered opposition who believe that the NGK has "forgotten and sold-out its own people" (Kritzinger 1989, 77).

Contrary to Strauss, Kritzinger praises C&S’ allegedly confessional view of Scripture when it teaches that the Bible must be interpreted. Hence is not a "recipe book" for social science." In interpretation, the "specific character, context, style, purpose and historic situation, must be explained" (Kritzinger 1989, 80). This paragraph, he implicitly acknowledges, is influenced by the New Hermeneutic. The Bible must be exposited "relative to its time." In other words, "the biblical truths are relative with respect to our situation" (Kritzinger 1989, 80). Context must be taken into account. If that does not happen, social theology becomes merely a biblicistic recipe, irrelevant to change society.

Therefore, the problem, he claims, is that C&S (1986) gives "good theology" in its first principial section. However, when it comes to implementing these insights, it does not use sola Scriptura [die Skrif alleen] but the practical reality [die praktyk] as the hermeneutical key to the understanding of the Biblical materials (Kritzinger 1989, 78).

The "good theology" is "not consequently applied" showing how difficult it is to escape from one’s deepest values even "though the Scripture asks otherwise" (Kritzinger 1989, 79). The excuse C&S gives for being inconsequent, Kritzinger claims, is found in paragraphs 238-239. These warn that the NGK must be careful not to be revolutionary. Practical considerations must be respected in the change process.

This, Kritzinger retorts, does not take into consideration the radical call of the Scripture to "repentance, total repentance, radical repentance. The demand of the Bible is urgent and final" (Kritzinger 1989, 79).

This shows that the NGK has not broken out of its "reference framework." It, therefore, uses Scripture in merely a "sterile academic way" (Kritzinger 1989, 81), divorced from the contextual reality of the "revolution that has been occurring for years and which in the last few years has developed into a civil war" (Kritzinger 1989, 80).

Johan Heyns rejects the critique of Kritzinger and others who find in C&S a "contradiction . . . between theory and practice" (Heyns 1991, 255). Heyns believes that the critics should have had much more appreciation for the slow but steady incremental change in Scriptural paradigm within the NGK. Too rapid revolutionary change would have awakened a massive, grass-roots conservative resistance.

As one of the key architects of C&S, Heyns’ commentary was correct. Fabians, though often spurred on by the revolutionaries, are most often more realistic and successful, hence pragmatically correct, than their ideological cousins.

It is certainly correct that the biblical and present socio-cultural context must be taken into account to correctly interpret and apply Scripture to change society. However, the creational designs and ethical norms reflecting the Creator’s character never changing in any culture transformation context.

Context of Contemporary Ecumenical Theology

Heideman sets C&S in the context of other contemporary Presbyterian and Reformed statements and confessions, e.g.,

These documents move from an emphasis upon "predestination and providence to eschatology and the kingdom of God in history" (Heideman 1988, 7).

Mark Ellingsen, then associate professor at the Institute for Ecumenical Research in Strasbourg, France, also sees a similar movement in the churches related to the WARC and WCC. "The majority of church statements which condemn racism, take pro-feminist positions, or advocate peace," he writes. In so doing, they follow Barth, the Barmen Confession (and incidentally the Radical Reformation) by validating "these positions by appeal to Christology or the nature of the Gospel" (Ellingsen 1988, 246). Thus these church statements reject apartheid theologies, such as HRLS, because they "conflict with the implications of the Confessional subscription." In other words, these churches believe that "the Gospel and other Second and Third Article loci [of the Apostle’s Creed] are seen as being compromised" by apartheid (Ellingsen 1988, 246; emphasis added).

Ellingsen specifically connects this paradigmatic change to the dialecticists’ rejection of a "conservative, even reactionary" protological creation theology (Ellingsen 1988, 247). This creational type theology, he writes, is exclusivist. It is exemplified by NGK racism, as well as American Evangelical and Roman Catholic rejection of homosexuality, abortion and female ordination. Major emphasis upon Second and Third Article themes lead to inclusivist, "liberal or radical ethical positions," all of which "appeal to the work of Christ and the inclusive nature of divine grace" (Ellingsen 1988, 247).

In addition, both Heideman and Ellingsen agree that this shift opens the Ecumenical churches "to recognizing God’s urgent desire for the liberation of the oppressed and for justice for all" (Heideman 1988, 7). The results are also radical. The former concern of Reformed Churches especially for "strict confessional continuity" to creational themes "no longer insures orthodoxy within the Reformed family of churches." The Confessions, therefore, "with their overarching concern for stability and order, serve to inhibit change in the face of oppression and tyranny" (Heideman 1988, 7).

Neither Heideman nor Ellingsen see in C&S such a consequent paradigm shift. Heideman claims it "stands in the older tradition while rejecting the urgency of the Reformed statements including those being written by other[s]" in South Africa. The result is that the NGK "continues to be isolated and regarded with suspicion" (Heideman 1988, 10). As has been and will be further seen, this analysis is only half true. C&S seems to be transitioning in the direction of the ecumenical consensus.

Discussion of the Creation-Eschaton Relationship

The basic problem many see in C&S, thus, is summarized by Ellingsen. Those "like the signers at Barmen" who "assume a revolutionary or progressive social ethic" appeal to Second Article themes. First Article themes lead to "conservative, even reactionary social teachings" (Ellingsen 1988, 238)

Ellingsen further explains this basic problem with NGK theology by comparing HRLS with C&S. First, he states that "[HRLS] . . . bypassed Biblical warrants, preferring natural/ creation warrants instead to authorize apartheid" (Ellingsen 1988, 239). He believes that this opened the door to an extra-biblical ideology to influence the NGK’s social theology:

One of these non-biblical themes, Ellingsen claims, is a "radical" social-theological "distinction" between

It is perhaps true that Kuyper’s creation doctrine is similar to Luther’s Two-Kingdom dogma. However, Ellingsen only discusses the Barth’s alternative, the church as an eschatological new creation cut off from creation. In the process, he virtually equates Luther’s "so-called ‘orders of creation,’" used by Nazi supporting "German Christians," with "‘the natural diversity of people’ [HRLS 14.5, 29-30, 60]" concept used by Kuyperian NGK theologians (Ellingsen 1988, 242).

Medieval-Barthian Nature-Grace Distinction

Several scholars with roots in the Amsterdam apologetic philosophy allege that C&S moves away from the confessional link between creation/providence (protology) and the Kingdom (eschatology). This departure from the classic perspective which links the first creation to the present new-creation reality has several roots and consequences.

The first root of disconnecting creation and eschatology is noted by Dooyeweerdian scholars, P. J. Strauss and H. J. Smith, and the exclusivist, Kuyperian scholars. They allege that C&S is dominated in most sections (though not all e.g., education) by a dualistic "grondmotief" coming from "Barthian influence." It is similar to the nature-grace dialectic of "Roman Catholic social dogma" (Strauss 1988, 39, citing Dooyeweerd 1959/1979) and "Scholastic theology" (Potgieter 1990, 52).

The cause is a "dualistic tension between the creation and recreation." A consequence of such tension is that C&S denies "the existence of [any] Christian social spheres other than the church." All other societal institutions are based upon "the creation and a cosmic law-order [wetsorde]" and hence cannot be Christian (Strauss 1988, 39; emphasis added).

According to Strauss, this means that the church and its visible unity are the show-window of the re-creative grace of the coming eschatological kingdom. Hence the church represents the only truly regenerated or "Christian" element in the social system. All other social spheres such as the family and civil governments and ethnic solidarity are part of the ontologically fallen and, hence, lower-level natural order. Logically, this doctrine concludes that the visible church cannot be made up of covenant families nor extended family units, but only believing individuals (see Potgieter 1990, 45ff).

P. J. and S. A. Strauss, H. J. Smith, Raath, and Potgieter, as Dooyeweerdian and Kuyperian scholars, make a further allegation about C&S’ dualistic tendencies. Since all non-church social structures are derived from the natural order, the church, as the sphere of the re-creation, is the only super-natural structure. Furthermore, since the upper story is the level of unity, and the lower story that of diversity, in cases of conflict between the church with its essential unity, and the lower, natural social spheres of diversity, the church’s unity principle must always take precedence.

"Unity" thus is equivalent to the morally good, "grace" area of life. The diversities of gender, age, class, language and culture, "in true scholastic manner, correspond to that of ‘nature.’" Diversities, then, are "subordinated to the first-named which becomes thus super-ordinate" (Strauss 1988, 42).

This superiority of the ecclesiastical sphere guarantees unity in the lower social structures. In other words, the unifying Kingdom truths (e.g., Gal 3:28) are a model for all other spheres of life. Abolitionism, non-ethnicism, and feminism, parts of one equalitarian ideology, is the norm for all of life.

Raath agrees: "The church [in C&S] is raised in reality to a super-sphere under which the ethnic bond [volksverband] is subjected." The result is that "all other [diverse] social spheres are devalued over-against the church" (Raath 1990, 80). Logically, then, the creation-providence oriented sphere of "peopleness" is relativized within the new creation oriented church.

The logic of such dualism is simple. The value of the social sphere of "church" which dwells in the unifying upper story, far outweighs the value, if any, of the lower story, differentiating social sphere of the people [volk]. Therefore, because C&S allegedly "views the unity of the church as belonging to a higher order than the diversity of [the church]," it abandons "the principial basis of the pluriformity [i.e., diversity] of the church" ([S.A.] Strauss 1987, 10).

Strauss, for one, still sees this nature-grace, creation-recreation dialectic in C&S 1990 (Strauss 1992). There still seems to be no allowance for the revelation of truth in the creation, he claims, citing the Belgic Confession (art. 2). It still seems to reject the biblical-confessional perspective as an "impure" natural theology (Strauss 1992, 948).

The antidote to such dualism is simple according to H. J. Smith’s Dooyeweerdianism. "All calling-spheres of life . . . stand equal" under the one task to love and serve the Lord in complete obedience. Thus no sphere is above any other (Smith 1988, 5). The manner which a "defined community of people obey or disobey with more or less obedience God’s calling" to serve him in each of these areas of life is "known as culture. Culture thus is how we arrange life in all its spheres." Thus, the Creator has given each community certain "own-structures" [ons-strukture] "within his creation" to help in the "completion of the cultural mandate" (Smith 1988, 5). These ethno-cultural specific structure are neglected in C&S which emphasizes a completely new creation divorced from the first creation.

A further consequence of the dualistic disconnection between creation and eschatology is found in the area of missiology. Kuyperian-Dooyeweerdian scholars further claim C&S’ nature-grace dualism downgrades true indigenization of the church. They make this claim even while acknowledging that C&S makes several statements concerning the necessity of the "legitimate indigenizing" of the church within the plural diversities of culture. C&S, they claim, accepts creational plurality while still maintaining the priority of re-creational unity. The reason for this is that the indigenization principle is not necessary to the "essence [wese] of the church," which is the only re-creational sphere (Strauss 1987, 10). Creational diversity therefore is only of secondary importance in the New Covenant.

The antidote to such dialecticism, S. A. Strauss claims, is to biblically distinguish between the universal church and "this [specific] church." The implication is that the universal, catholic church is truly one but it does "not exist anywhere concretely in this world." Whenever "the church" is concretely localized as "this church," "all the circumstances of these believers (among which are [place], language and culture) . . . must of necessity be taken into account." These "circumstances are never neutral but exist under the providential determination of God" (Strauss 1987, 11).

Though not himself escaping from dualism, Strauss is correct in concluding that God’s

F. J. M. Potgieter (see Potgieter 1990 [chapter 3]) shows from Reformed history that creation oriented, ethnic-based churches were allowed within one national Synod. The reformers doctrine of "one, holy, catholic church" did not mandate one unitary institution like the Roman church. For example, in the Netherlands, there were separate general synods for the Walloon and Dutch churches.

Furthermore, he states, Calvin and the Genevan Reformers did not criticize but encouraged the separate Swiss, French, Scots, and English reformed churches that were unified around the Reformed confession but not institutionally one. In Geneva itself, each ethno-linguistic group of refugees had a separate congregation to serve its unique cultural and linguistic distinctives. At the same time they were united by the one reformed confession under a common, reformed civil government.

A third ramification of dualism is C&S’ alleged rejection of the confessional visible-invisible church distinction. In Reformed doctrine, and especially in the Kuyperian-Dooyeweerdian tradition, the church is much more than a visible institution. As H. J Smith implied, the people of God are the whole Body of Christ living out practical dominion in all spheres of life.

Kuyperian-Dooyeweerdian confessionalists allege that C&S separates the unified church-institute from the ontological fallenness of the world and in so doing confuses "the [institutional] church with the kingdom" ([S. A.] Strauss 1987, 19).

Thus this confusing the institutional church with the kingdom cause those who do so to identify the "institutional church with the ekklesia" (Raath 1990, 10). The ecclesia, however, in many New Testament contexts is equivalent to the Old Testament qahal Yahweh. The ecclesia, thus, in those contexts is not an institution but the People as citizens of Yahweh’s Kingdom. That Kingdom, as it did in the Old Testament, encompasses all social spheres as they are brought, through his people’s faithful obedience, under the dominion of the heaven enthroned King, that is Jesus the Anointed (see Psalm 2 and 110).

In thus distinquishing between the institutional and invisible church, these confessionalists hold to a classic view of a two-fold church unity. The unity of the institutional church is "constituted through the Word [confession], sacrament and discipline." On the other hand, the unity of the qahal Yahweh is a "given reality in Christ" (Strauss 1988, 43). Hence "as such it is not necessary to be made ‘visible’ [in institutional structures as C&S demands]" (Strauss 1988, 42).

Therefore, Strauss states, the power of the re-creation is experienced in more social spheres than merely the visible, institutional church. For example, families and political parties bound together by a common vision of biblical justice can also now be sharing in the re-creation’s kingdom. This seems correct.

P. J. Strauss claims that C&S 1990 still fails to make this crucial distinction in its use of the word "church." He summarizes: "church" still sometimes means all those "‘in Christ,’ that is the citizens of the kingdom." Other times it seems to mean a societal sphere or institution (Strauss 1992, 947).

A. W. G. Raath, in conclusion, faults C&S for not holding to classic reformed categories. C&S does not "consequently maintain . . . the distinction" between the sphere of the ecclesia invisibilis, the universal church as citizens of the kingdom, and ecclesia visibilis, the church as a societal bond in the institutional sense (Raath 1989, 9).

The result is that that C&S often uses the word "church" in a non-nuanced manner. Often C&S discusses the characteristics of the invisible church, and then applies all these qualities to the NGK as an "institutional sphere." Raath explicitly states that he agrees with S. A. Strauss’ criticism at this point. C&S "shows in this respect a lack of dogmatic discrimination [onderskeiding]" (Raath 1990, 9). Raath claims that HRLS is much more theologically accurate than C&S at this point because it distiquishes between the church as Kingdom and church as cultic institution.

Raath, Potgieter, and S. A. Strauss all agree that confusing the invisible kingdom-church with the visible institutional church effects a church’s ecumenical striving. It leads to great pressure to mandate the formation of one, visible and structurally unified church. This is indeed what is happening at the present.

Raath pushes this alleged Medieval, dualist assumption to its logical extreme. If unity in Christ means complete visible and physical unity then the worship services of the various churches of the NGK family, meeting in different buildings at different times, disrupt and break the material unity of the church. In addition, the "existence of different congregations in the NG Kerk and the fact that all NG Kerk members don’t worship under one roof, results in a sinful schism in the ecclesiastical unity" (Raath 1990, 73).

Inclusivists’ Denial of Exclusivists’ Conclusions

The proponents of a inclusive church reject exclusivists’ claims that confessional, reformed ecclesiology allows for separate churches for distinct peoples within a confessional unity. Indeed the ideal of one church structure for all individuals within a defined geographical region was originally practiced by the Cape Church within its church order. The break with that practice came only in last quarter of the nineteenth century (1881) with the decision to establish a separate church for colored people of the Cape (formerly the NG Sending Kerk [NG Mission Church]) (see Smith 1980; Adonis 1982; see Potgieter 1990; Boshoff 1987 for exclusivist’s reply).

Johan Kinghorn, professor at US, justifies Barthian ecclesiocentricism within C&S (Kinghorn 1990c, 29-32). C&S’ focus on the "uniqueness of the church as the community of believers," is parallel to the rediscovery of ecclesiology by the ecumenical church which, following Barth, reacted to race-bound Nazi ideology in the German church. The only "norm" for church unity is "faith," not a group based on the creation. The church, thus,

Kinghorn here subtly acknowledges that C&S incorporates a real paradigm shift in its view of the relationship of church to society, despite denying this at the beginning of his article. His major premise is that the normal, natural joints and building blocks of society are not valid nor normative in the church, God’s window upon the future. Therefore, anyone desiring to build the other institutions of society upon the divine ideal must also ignore normal creational distinctions of gender, social class, age, language, ethnicity and so forth.

Kinghorn summarizes the NGK’s paradigm shift by stating that until C&S, the NGK General Synod taught that the unity of the church is primarily an invisible, spiritual unity. When that unity becomes visible in this age, it occurs only within the existing unities of the creation. Thus, the church can only visibly demonstrate its spiritual unity within the contours of the volk(e). The one church of Christ is therefore visible in a "multiplicity of ethnic [volkse] churches" (Kinghorn 1989, 37) but not in one non-volk-based institute which, he claims, the Gospel implies. He reasons that HRLS’ concept of volk is clearly relative because it is "built upon a concept of race" not a Gospel faith. Therefore, "not faith, but volk and race is determinative for making the church visible."

However, since the late fifties, "a growing group of theologians in the NGK . . . have resisted" this creation-bound concept officially supported by HRLS. This group "influenced the title of C&S as well as the concept of church in C&S." The title of the C&S, "implicitly acknowledges that the church is a unique [eiesoortige] fellowship and thus should be able to stand over against [teenoor] society" (Kinghorn 1989, 37).

In Kinghorn’s opinion, the paradigm change C&S makes in the NGK’s definition of the church could have far-reaching effects. Certainly it would "de-ideologize" the NGK, if what was begun in the "ecclesiological area" could "overflow" into a "fundamental change in the [NGK]’s standpoints on [socio-political] apartheid" (Kinghorn 1989, 38).

This is a crucial point which supports the contention of some exclusivists that a change in church polity must spill over into social polity. As seen in chapter two, the protesters who were related to the Voorsettingskomitee anticipated this overflow in their various documents and conferences (see e.g., F&P).

Kinghorn reports that the paradigm shift in ecclesiology and its overflow into social or public theology, has actually been gradually occurring over the last two decades. At least, he claims, since the 1974 General Synod which produced HRLS. C&S (1986) shows an "uncomfortable parity" or "a compromise" between the old paradigm and the new. The "newer (more pure) ecclesiology" emphasizes the "church as fellowship of believers" while the older is a "theology of peopleness [volksheid]," "in other words, apartheid" (Kinghorn 1989, 38).

Kinghorn terms this "newer theology" "ecclesiocentric." The other he calls a "creation-order motivated social theology" (Kinghorn 1989, 39). He applauds this shifts "away from ras (volk en nasie) [Race (people and nation)]" to a non-ethnic based church and eventually society. The reason is that the paradigm shift actually "runs parallel to the broader political developments of the past several years" (Kinghorn 1989, 39).

In summary, Kinghorn claims that C&S teaches that the church is something non-[old] creational or even perhaps anti-creational. As a new-creational institute, it must determine such things as membership, order and gender in the offices, etc. apart from any reference to creation.

However, a discussed earlier, Kinghorn criticizes this newer theology (C&S) for compromising with the older social theology (HRLS). This compromise is best evidenced by the contradiction between the practical sections and the doctrinal section. The practical section still clings to social "apartheid" which he defines as any group differentiation along ethnic, national and racial lines while the normative section rejects such apartheid in the church. Therefore, C&S theoretically rejects "‘racism’" between "people within the differentiating social structures" of segregated residential areas and ethnic-tribal homelands. C&S (1986) does not question the racial-ethnic based structures themselves, only "what occurs within the structures" (Kinghorn 1989, 39). Racism in Kinghorn’s view is more than unkind attitudes and actions and arrogant theories about group superiority. To truly reject racism, the NGK must totally reject any theory postulating "group" as a basis for ordering society.

Conclusion

S. A. Strauss (Strauss 1987), Potgieter (Potgieter 1990), and Raath (Raath 1988), all share a common conclusion. The traditional reformed doctrine of unity does not imply that the "spiritual unity of faith (Belgic Confession art. 27) of necessity must be found in one structure" (Strauss 1987, 10).

Therefore, they all agree, there should be no conscience problem for those who believe and teach the traditional NGK missions policy. The planting of different ethno-racial based churches in one geographical area is a biblical strategy. The only stipulation is that all share a common reformed confession and that all proclaim in harmony the peace of the kingdom. The doctrine that "such diversity is not divisive dissension [verskeurdheid] nor in the least part sinful," both of which C&S seems to imply, is a conclusion which seems essentially correct (Strauss 1987, 10; emphasis in original).

Second, concerning C&S’ view of the church, F. J. M. Potgieter, P. J. Strauss (Strauss 1988) and S. A. Strauss, and Raath seem correct in their detection of a scholastic nature-grace dualism. These ethnic-church thinkers are correct in pointing out that the medieval dualism leads C&S to postulate a "higher calling in the church than in the other ‘lower’ terrains of life" (Strauss 1987, 7). In disagreement with this, these thinkers correctly teach that "the church cannot claim a higher loyalty than any other societal sphere, [such as] for example, marriage, the family, school, the state, etc." (Strauss 1987, 19).

This reviewer agrees that if a dualist philosophical presupposition is found in C&S, then the emphasis upon the unity of the church apart from creational diversities is biblically erroneous. As S. A. Strauss points out, to emphasize the "unity of the church at the expense of diversity" shows a "lack of careful theological distinctions" (Strauss 1987, 19), echoing assertions by P. J. Strauss (1992), N. J. Smith (1988), and Potgieter (1990).

Third, in this reviewer’s opinion, both the Dooyeweerdian and Afrikaner ethnic theologians correctly criticize C&S’ lack of a careful definition of the church. C&S rejects or at least neglects the crucial difference between "church" as a visible institute and "church" as the invisible, universal Body of Christ, a community of influencing all of life as re-born Christians.

However, in so criticizing C&S, these theologians do not break out of Kuyper’s common grace, special grace dualism. Like Kuyper, they teach that the church is part of a special grace sphere of life. Hence, like Kuyper, they tend to abandon all other spheres to a natural ordering under a natural law which does not use biblical law as its foundation (see [H.] Van Til 1972).

Lastly, the Kuyperian-Dooyeweerdian scholars, both the exclusivists and non-exclusivists, don’t seem to seriously deal with the biblical mandate for visible structures of unity within the recreation order. Confessional agreement is one major part of that unity, but not the only major element. True unity and real diversity is inherent in all just creational orders that are cleansed and rebuilt in the recreation.

It seems, then, that Heideman’s criticism of C&S, cited earlier, is not accurate. In its normative sections, C&S has been deeply influenced by the post-war paradigm shift, which moved from emphasizing creation and providence to stressing the presence of the future kingdom and the new creation. However, in adopting the post-war shift, C&S is not as consequently consistent as the other semi-confessional documents Heideman lists.

Trinitarianism, they agree, together with the "enlightenment of the Spirit," is the "hermeneutical key" to unlock Scripture (Potgieter 1990, 21, 51). This means that within the Godhead, "both unity and diversity are absolute and perfect." Neither "may be relativized," both are in "perfect harmony without any opposition" (Potgieter 1990, 21).

This means further that the unity and diversity of creation and providence is "founded upon the one being of God" (Potgieter 1990, 22) In other words, the immanence of God Triune is "analogously revealed" in both the diversities and unities of the creation-providential and re-creational orders (Potgieter 1991, 58). Because these writers place both a just political and an ecclesial order in the sphere of creation-providence, each must reveal unity and multiform diversity simultaneously.

These Afrikaner ethnic thinkers agree that C&S seems to downplay human diversities while overemphasizing human unity. They claim C&S sees unity as foundational in the new creation. The diversities of the original creation and providential ordering are only of secondary, but not of essential, importance. In this context Potgieter boldly asserts, "C[&]S does not have a Trinitarian substrate" (Potgieter 1990, 31).

This neglect of the Trinitarian presupposition, these scholars claim, is seen in C&S’ teaching on two doctrines. First of all, C&S allegedly places a dialectical opposition between the creation and the new creation, which C&S defines as the institutional church. They claim that C&S teaches that the new creational church is not based on the first creation hence it cannot be based on such creational diversities as ethnicity. This has already been discussed extensively and will only be touched on briefly here. Secondly, the rejection of the Trinitarian presupposition results in a "total under estimation" of the meaning of the "divine intervention at Babel" (Potgieter 1990, 32).

First of all, exclusivist Missiologist and C&S commission member, C. W. H. Boshoff, feels strongly that in the church both unity and diversity are possible. Furthermore, he believes that in C&S the NGK is "reestablishing" its earlier stand on this issue [as explained by HRLS] (Boshoff 1987, 12). He believes that C&S would support this conclusion. Consequently, Boshoff defends the consensual wording of the 1986 edition of C&S ("die eenheid die verskeidenheid te bowe gaan") ["unity transcends diversity"].

To defend this wording, Boshoff adopts a Platonic-dualistic understanding of unity and diversity. For both to exist "at the same time" "unity must extend over and above ["bo-oor"] diversity." In other words, "unity transcends diversity, they are thus not in mutual conflict" (Boshoff 1987, 11).

To support his interpretation, Boshoff cites Herman Ridderbos who writes on the relationship of people to church. In so doing he shows the intimate interface between the doctrines of creation, Trinitarianism and Scripture. Ridderbos first emphasizes the unity of the church, then states that the church, nevertheless, is not a "timeless" [platonic-dualist] concept, removed from national, cultural, ethnic specifics. Therefore, the church institute is not "holy" in the sense that it is removed from the world and its peoples in which it exists. Its members do not need to withdraw, in an anabaptistic sense, as far as possible from their cultural and ethnic distinctiveness (see Boshoff 1987, 3).

Boshoff and Ridderbos emphasize that the church is both Spiritual — from the Holy Spirit — and natural. It is both international and local or parochial. Church members are both members of their ethno-cultural group and of their indigenous church. There is no necessary conflict, thus, between unity and diversity. Boshoff believes this is what C&S 1986 in reality teaches.

Dooyeweerdian sociologist, H. J. Smith, on the other hand, clearly accuses C&S of a non-Trinitarian dualism coming from scholastic theology. This elevates unity to the primary principle of life. It does not deny diversity since "all universalists recognize indeed the existence of the ‘parts’" but it is "a diversity within the unity ([C&S] par. 11.9.2)" (Smith 1988, 8). Therefore, Smith alleges, C&S elevates the church as institute, dwelling in the sphere of re-creational unity, to a place of supremacy over all other spheres of life.

Furthermore, Smith writes, if this anti-Trinitarian model "serves as the cosmological key" to existence, then the NGK has clearly sold its members out to the "modern universalist-humanist" endeavor to "gain unity and equality at any cost." In so doing, C&S is not following Scripture but the "slogan of the French Revolution" (Smith 1988, 8). Only a consequently Christian, Trinitarian standpoint can hold unity and diversity in balance without giving "primacy" to one or the other (Smith 1988, 8).

F. J. M. Potgieter, in his turn, also rejects a scholastic dualism to justify his emphasis on diversity. He reasons that if both unity and diversity are good and neither is logically prior to the other, then the immanent diversity of the earth reflects God’s glory as much as the earthly unities do.

Potgieter, however, is not consequent in seeing all the implications of this Trinitarian principle. It seems he also does not completely understand, for example, the implications of Babel. He writes that "spontaneous communication . . . became much more difficult" as a function of God’s "punishment" (Potgieter 1991, 23) at Babel. By implication, then, contrary to HRLS, ethno-linguistic diversity is a punishment and only a temporal expediency in order to "check sin" (Potgieter 1991, 23).

The need for a sin-check will no longer be necessary in heaven. Then and only then will a pre-Babel-like, mono-lingual unified humanity be restored. Now, however, as a consequence of the need for a sin-check, the church on the earth must be built on ethno-linguistic identity with certain limitations.

Unfortunately, Potgieter did not interpret the Babel pericope using the Trinitarian principle. This shows that he, following Kuyper, has not escaped from a nature-grace dualism (see Van Til 1972). A more biblical approach would be to see the unified, mystical Body of Christ not as a completely unique, miracle of God, but as the restoration of the original creation design in its intended matured form (see Restorative Eschatology Principle).

In this reviewer’s opinion, the original people of God, the church in the garden, was a plural-unity as a prototype of the pluriformity of what was to come. Special grace even in the church corrects and restores that which is ravaged by sin. It has never been something added to, over and above the creation ideal as designed by God.

Few inclusivist theologians deal seriously with the foundational dogmatic-philosophical issue of Trinitarianism. One who does is C&S Commission member, Johan Heyns. Heyns’ review of Potgieter’s volume mentioned above, however, misrepresents his argument on the relationship of diversity and unity in the Trinity and then rejects it out of hand (Heyns 1991b).

To his credit, Heyns correctly reports Potgieter’s claim that the unity of the church is analogous to the unity found in the one substance of the Godhead. This unity is mystical and invisible in both God and the church. Heyns is also correct in recording Potgieter’s belief that the formation of the church must be diverse corresponding to the diversity within the Godhead. Because it is diverse, it is not necessary to become one structural formation. This opens the door to indigenous, self-governing churches united to similar churches by confession and sacrament.

However, Heyns seems to misrepresents Potgieter when he claims Potgieter sees the unifying "essence" of the church as belonging to the sphere of "God’s special grace" whereas its diverse "formation" belongs to the "common grace" "creation order . . . similar to all other institutions"(Heyns 191, 861). This means, he claims Potgieter teaches, that the church must never be visibly one because its visible form is determined by ethnicity which "is not one, but a diversity" (Heyns 191, 861).

In other words, Heyns claims Potgieter teaches that unity is part of the special grace order and is a "spiritual reality," whereas diversity as part of a common grace order is not spiritual but actual (Heyns 1991, 862). Therefore, never may spiritual unity and actual diversity meet in this broken age.

At this point Heyns seems to misunderstand Potgieter with the suggestion that he falls into a nature-grace dualism. However, without escaping it totally, Potgieter does reject this "scholastic-theological tradition" as actually a basic presupposition of C&S (Potgieter 1991, 52; see also 53).

It is interesting to note here that Potgieter wants to protect diversity by appealing to the Trinitarian presupposition. In doing so, he shows that the "invisible church" principle is immanent in the visible creation. Logically then, but contrary to Potgieter and Heyns, both true unity and real diversity must be visible to glorify the invisible God whose unity of essence and diversity of Persons is invisible (Col 1:15, 1Ti 1:17).

Second, contrary to both Heyns and Potgieter, both special and common grace are the grounds of existence for the church as well as all other creation-spheres. Potgieter, thus, agrees with the inclusivists within the NGK that the eschaton will be a non-gender, non-ethnic, non-class, unique New Creation — the corpus mysticum Christi fulfilled.

The only difference between Potgieter, Heyns, and the inclusivists is that the last-named, in line with modern eschatological thought, push the inclusivist, eschatological new age into the present in the form of the institutional church.

A recent volume, edited by NGK professors, is a semi-official account of NGK policy on ecumenicity and mission: Een Ligaam — Baie Lede: Die Kerk se Ekumeniese Roeping Wêreldwyd en in Suid-Afrika [One Body — Many Members: The Churches Ecumenical Call Worldwide and in South Africa] (Gous and Crafford 1993). It teaches that church unity is "grounded in God Triune" and in the fact of the gathering of all types of people "‘in the unity of the true faith’" (HC, ques. 54) (Gous and Crafford 1993, 412). It implies that C&S (89, 92, 93, 97) and the NGK policy on ecumenicity agrees with the cited catechism question.

Furthermore, similar to C&S 1990 (see para. 121), the volume interprets this confessional unity in the Trinity to mean that "diversity must never invalidate the unity but must rather serve it." Thus, it continues, "the visible unity of the one catholic church is very important. . . . Ecumenicism is an extremely important activity of the church"(Gous and Crafford 1993, 409). However, there is no discussion of what the hermeneutical and philosophical implications of Trinitarianism should be for the diversity and unity of the church of Christ.

Throughout the volume, unity is assumed to have superior status and hence logical priority to diversity. Diversity merely "serves" unity. There can be no other conclusion drawn from this statement. This a priori assumption, thus, serves as the hermeneutical "glasses" through which ecumenicism is understood and applied. In other words, Gous and Crafford’s volume uses an extra-biblical presupposition to interpret Scripture instead of the analogy of faith. This presupposition seems to be similar to that used to develop theological Modalism (see Lategan and others 1987, König 1989b, and Kinghorn 1990b for similar virtual Modalism).

The Apartheid Bible: A Critical Review of Racial Theology in South Africa (Loubser 1987) also touches upon this topic. He states that Afrikaner distrust of humanist unity is influenced by Kuyper, especially his, Eenvormigheid, de Vloek van het Modern Leven [Uniformity, the Curse of Modern Life] (Kuyper 1869).

Loubser, however, does not answer Kuyper’s implicit Trinitarian argument. He merely first affirms, Karl Barth’s teaching about the Total Otherness of God which "relativises" everything in the space-time world including every -ism. Then he emphasizes the priority of the oneness of God in a manner similar to ancient Modalism which also relativizes his true diversity:

Loubser quotes a late NGK theologian, T. N. Hanekom from US, as the opposing perspective. This is not a fair juxtaposition because Hanekom’s justification of apartheid, if Loubser’s translation is accurate, uses an almost tritheistic definition of the Godhead. Thus, rightly rejecting Tritheism, Loubser affirms the opposite, a virtual Modalism. Loubser concludes: "Because God is one, his people are one. Whoever believes in the one God cannot be a separatist" (Loubser 1987, 165).

The conclusion is certainly correct but it does not follow from his stated premises. Actually the conclusion, "no believer should be a separatist," flows from true Trinitarian premises. Because God is a tri-unity, his people must be reflecting his real diversity by means of their real gender, age, socio-economic, and ethnic diversities while at the same time expressing his true unity within truly visible structures of unity.

The inclusivist article "On the theology of Church and Society in the DRC" (Kinghorn 1990a) also touches upon the relationship of unity to diversity in the church. Kinghorn claims to see in the pre-C&S tradition an "idealist concept of unity": believers were "united in God and not in reality" (Kinghorn 1990a, 25, 30). Therefore C&S did not "rediscover" the concept of unity but "shifted the emphasis to visible unity as opposed to idealist [invisible] unity" (Kinghorn 1990a, 25).

By this he seems to mean that the earlier tradition uses a dualistic concept of unity separating the "higher, spiritual unity" (Kinghorn 1990a, 25) from earthly, natural diversity. On the plane of platonic, spiritual ideas, believers from every race, nation and social class are brothers and sisters in Christ. However, in both church and society they should be separated. It was a "unity of faith and not a unity of the faithful (Kinghorn 1990a, 31; emphasis in original).

C&S, thus, has merely moved unity from the spiritual plane to the earthly, visible plane without rejecting the underlying dualism. In other words, though down-playing it as a "given," C&S does not reject the concept of created diversity as an inherent, "system of injustice" (Kinghorn 1990a, 28).

At one point, however, Loubser is correct. As seen, many exclusivist NGK theologians like Potgieter accept the concept that only in the eschaton "beyond secular history" will ethnic, class, and gender distinctions be removed in a visible unity (Kinghorn 1990a, 30). C&S has moved the inclusivist visible unity of the church from the "not yet" and "beyond" to the "now," and "already". This creates a tension between the created "given" and the utopian, eschatological "ideal" at the present time. This is in line with present ecumenical eschatology.

The problem with this newer approach, however, is that it does not reject dualism. A consequent "Trinitarian substrate" is not applied: true diversity and real visible unity.

Kinghorn’s problem-solution is erroneous. He defines the relationship of unity and diversity so that unity has complete priority and pre-eminence over any diversity at all times. Diversity then has only a very temporal and non-essential importance. Society’s "normal distinctions," in other words, its structural biases of class, gender, as well as race and nation, are "not normative" (Kinghorn 1990c, 30).

Clearly, however, both original humanity — even in a fallen state — as well as recreated humanity in the church must reflect both Trinitarian unity and diversity. Ethnic diversity in the church and civil realm, thus, cannot be evil or wrong in principle. Afrikaner, ethnic-theology thinkers are right at this point.

If ethnic diversity is not caused by sin, then logically, the exclusivist’s claim is correct. The new creation does not destroy the providentially created "pluriformity [veelvormigheid] of peoples, languages, nations, each in it own boundaried living place [on the earth]" (see F&P, 1.4). This providential provision would indeed imply that God does desire "a rich pluriformity" [veelvormigheid] in the church not "a bland uniformity" [eenvormigheid] (see F&P, 1.12).

The implication of Faith and Protest, produced by a group, the majority of which later broke from the NGK over C&S (1986), agrees with other exclusivist authors and documents. C&S underestimates ethnicity and indigeneity (see F&P, 1.26). Ethnicity is more than just a given as C&S claims. In other words, ethnicity is not something to be merely acknowledged and worked with, it is something good and hence something to be protected by godly people who love God’s truth and his good creation (see F&P, 1.18, 9.12).

One can grant the truth of the above logical deduction from the Trinitarian principle without agreeing with the other conclusions exclusivists arrive at from their premises.

Many who developed HRLS and F&P attempted to apply something of the Trinitarian presupposition to society as they developed apartheid theology. However, in the process of applying this principle, they syncretized it with extra-biblical, race prejudice. That prejudice, influenced the development and outworking of apartheid theory resulting in an over-emphasis on diversity and under-emphasis on unity (see C&S, 278-288).

F&P and HRLS before it, correctly affirm that all mankind is one in its descent from the first couple (see HRLS, 8, F&P, 1.2). Yet both claim that this human oneness does not necessitate the deduction that renewed humanity should be united in one visible, institutional church. Not all the social "divisions" in humankind are the result of sin.

F&P and HRLS are certainly correct when they point out that all diversity is not the result of sin. Much diversity is the result of God’s "providential determination" which causes a diversity of peoples, nations and culture-communities to come into existence. This providentially created diversity does not in any way void human unity but "enriches it" (F&P, 1.2).

Trinitarian truth is a foundational and inescapable premise in any biblical, reformed social theology. Afrikaner proponents of the goodness of ethnic (as well as gender, age and class) distinction, are correct here. They rightly deduce that the real unity and true diversity of the Godhead is reflected in the unities and diversities of (1) creation, (2) the providential development of creation, and (3) in the recreation.

The error which exclusivist documents make is to divorce human diversity from the unity of mankind. To truly distinguish between the two principles is correct. However, using the Trinitarian presupposition one cannot divorce them because both are equally ultimate. In other words, threeness can never be divorced from oneness within the Godhead. The result of this divorce is that most exclusivist documents are very reticent to notice the syncretistic injustice in the apartheid system.

In sum, Trinitarian truth has been only dimly seen by exclusivists. To be compassionately applied to a post-New South African society the Lord may grant in the future, much work and thought remains to be done.

Lastly, the inclusivist misunderstanding of the Trinitarian presupposition ("unity is then more important than diversity"), coupled with Barthian dualism, leads to theological imbalance. In other words, destroying the distinction between the church as a social institution and church as the Body of true believers logically means placing highest value on church unity. Inclusivist, Nico Smith explains what this means in practice. Since, the visible "church (structure) is the full summary of Christianity on earth; the ‘show window’ [e.g., C&S 72] of how God works," he explains, "the following step is necessarily church structural unity at all costs" (Smith 1988, 8). The resulting danger of placing unity above truth is very real.

Few studies on the doctrine of the covenant expressly link a change in the traditional understanding of the doctrine of the covenant to the development of NGK social theology during the last three decades up to an including C&S.

One important recent work The Thousand Generation Covenant: Dutch Reformed Covenant Theology and Group Identity in Colonial South Africa, 1652-1814 (Gerstner 1991), however, fill in an important gap in the understanding of how the Afrikaner self-consciousness as a "covenant people" developed. This work demonstrates an historical link between a false understanding of covenant theology (presumptive regeneration) and the development of a separationist perspective on inter-racial relations up to 1814 (see author’s review, Kreitzer 1994).

Up to now, contemporary historiography has claimed that there was no wide-spread Calvinistic, covenantal consensus among the Dutch settlers until at least 1850. Gerstner has debunked this reigning academic theory which was crystallized by anti-nationalist, political philosopher, André du Toit (Du Toit 1975, 1983; see Moodie 1975, Hexham 1981, Templin 1984, see literature review by Akenson 1992, 56ff).

The original covenantal emphasis has certainly developed and been nuanced. However, even to the present, the Afrikaner people are constantly told by conservative pastors and politicians that they are a verbondsvolk and a beloftevolk [a covenant people and a people of a vow]. Thus especially conservative minded Afrikaner use history in covenantal terms similar to the ancient biblical people. Thus history has been consistently used "to explain the past in moral [covenantal] terms and to guide their planning for the future" (Akenson 1992, 63).

God’s peoples: Covenant and Land in South Africa, Israel, and Ulster documents the power of this covenantal paradigm in the Afrikaner world-view (Akenson 1992). His thesis is that "ancient [Mosaic] Hebrew covenant" is a "primary" worldview template for interpreting and "mak[ing] sense of" Afrikaner past and future culture (Akenson 1992, 6). Referring to Templin’s, Ideology on a Frontier (Templin 1984), Akenson’s claims that this means the "distorting lens" of Christology placed "in front of the Hebrew texts" was non-existent. The Afrikaner was only "in theory Christian," but was not actually "Christianized" (Akenson 1992, 61).

This covenantal "blueprint" which the Afrikaner felt bound to was a collective, conditional "bargain" between Yahweh, the sovereign, and a people. It continues "generation after generation" (Akenson 1992, 13). By this Akenson means that the "singularity and specialness" of the covenant People is bound up in the "seed" (Akenson 1992, 22). In the "seed," the "corporate existence" is continued across the generations (Akenson 1992, 23). "Biology, therefore, becomes as vital as belief in determining the corporate entity" (Akenson 1992, 23). Last, covenant always includes sanctions: "extremely severe" "penalty clauses . . . for lapses" and comprehensive blessing for obedience (Akenson 1992, 16-17).

Furthermore, he believes, there is only one "small" step between affirming biology, faith, and such sanctions, to the Pharisaical dogma that "the possession of might (whether in the form of economic prosperity or military power)" by our people "is evidence that one is morally right" (Akenson 1992, 16).

The reason for this, in Akenson’s view, is that Yahweh’s covenant was ultimately not gracious but legal, "there is no suggestion that one should do right for the sake of doing right" (Akenson 1992, 19). The motive for good and evil is recompense.

This small step to a legal bargain gave Afrikaners the belief that

At present, however, Akenson shows that this reigning Afrikaner "covenantal belief system . . [which gave] no room for [ethnic, class, or value] pluralism" has broken down. The reason for this break down was that "the volk no longer existed." Individuals, political parties, and "competing economic and class interests" exist, he rightly claims, but not a singular volk (Akenson 1992, 300).

The differences between HRLS and C&S, he writes, clearly show this break-down in covenantal thought. If one accepts its assumptions, HRLS is a "lucid," "rational," and "very subtle" document (Akenson 1992, 305). In contrast to this, C&S is "confused, staccato, and contradictory," reflecting Afrikaner uncertainty and guilt (Akenson 1992 306-307). To change the NGK’s view on "race" and "ethnic relations," C&S had to "change totally its reading of the scripture." This meant not only to "repudiate the [covenantal] hermeneutics" of HRLS, but also to reject the "official interpretation of the scriptures" that "goes all the way back to 1859 [at least]," the time when the church founded its first seminary and began to "develop an indigenous South African Reformed theology" (Akenson 1992, 307).

This hermeneutical change, he states, meant the subtle rejection of Hebrew covenantalism, as he interprets it legalistically. To do this, the commission writing C&S "decided to go with the ‘New Testament’ rather than the ‘Old’" (Akenson 1992, 305), rejecting the Hebrew template and accepting the "equality of all humankind before God" in the new, non-covenantal teaching of Jesus (Akenson 1992, 306).

This remark appears accurate. C&S does seem to reject a reformed-covenantal perspective as we shall see. However, the problem with Akenson’s view is that although, as Gerstner shows, a misunderstanding of the covenant was indeed the basis of much of the feeling of separatist, Afrikaner solidarity, Akenson’s understanding of the doctrine is also slanted. His view of the "ancient Hebrew covenant" includes, as an integral part, the "idea of there being a Chosen People in the physical sense" leading to "distinctions between people based on their ethnicity or social standing" (Akenson 1992, 305-306).

However, HRLS does not divide people based on this Pharisaical-physical view of covenant. As Gerstner implies, this thought may remain as a subtle almost sub-conscious, cultural pre-understanding among Afrikaner theologians, it is no-where explicit or implicit in the best of apartheid theology (e.g., HRLS). HRLS does not see the Afrikaner as the Chosen People but rather a sovereign, created covenant-like sphere under God. The concept of volk as a sovereign sphere was then syncretized with a concept which Moodie (1992) and others correctly claim to be infected with Germanic, romantic-monistic idealism. That syncretism, not the biblical doctrine of the covenant, misled HRLS theologians into merging the biblical concept of ethno-covenantal solidarity with the humanistic concept of ethno-racial purity. This syncretism lead to HRLS’ rejection of miscegenation, an error which C&S rightly overturns.

With this correction, however, Akenson’s insight that C&S rejects any concept of group solidarity because it adopts a "New Testament paradigm" of equal individuals before God seems accurate. That in itself, as shall be seen, is a de facto rejection of the covenant concept of family solidarity under God.

Ethno-covenantal Solidarity: A Created Sphere

Afrikaner ethnic theologians, thus, believe that their volk is a sovereign sphere, like the family, church and state, created by God and upheld by his providence. These theologians, along with HRLS, posit a doctrinal, thematic and verbal connection between the Cultural Mandate to spread over the earth to exercise dominion over it, and the Babel pericope in which the people of earth refused to scatter over the earth (Ge 10-11).

HRLS teaches that this mandate to diversify, to scatter and thus fill the earth was being deliberately subverted by the tower builders. "Lest we be scattered over the face of the earth" was their reason for wanting an ungodly unity. If they had scattered, linguistic and hence ethnic and genetic-racial distinctions would have gradually lead to the diversity of lingual-cultural groups due to distance and isolation.

By creating various languages, thus, God sped up the diffusion principle implicit in the Cultural Mandate. From this, the Afrikaner exclusivist theologians have deduced that such diversity was part of God’s plan even before the Fall. Their deduction that ethnic diversity is good and part of the creation covenant’s design seems valid (see Covenant Principle).

Covenantal themes are repeatedly mentioned in conservative circles to warrant exclusive, Afrikaner institutions. In saying this, however, HRLS, as the apex the NGK’s justification of the doctrine of ethnic diversity, did not use the covenant motif to validate such diversity. Instead it used a modified application of sphere sovereignty doctrine.

This reviewer believes, however, that covenant, creation, and sphere sovereignty are intimately connected. Each family, clan, and people is an ethno-covenantal solidarity, covenanted to Yahweh or to a false god. There is no other alternative.

The link between ethno-covenantal solidarity, the creational Dominion Covenant (Cultural Mandate), and Babel is hotly disputed by advocates of an inclusive social order.

A typical example is Stellenbosch University theologian, Johan Kinghorn. He asserts that HRLS is merely an "apology for the concept of ethnic diversity." As such, it attempts to incorrectly use proto-historical themes to make a "theological case for ethnicity as the original anthropological order and therefore the socio-political, and the ecclesiological ordering principle as well" (Kinghorn 1989, 33).

C&S, thus, is merely a sophisticated form of this racial-ethnic theology, he claims. In both C&S and HRLS, ethnicity is accepted as an unspoken presupposition. Thus as a revision of HRLS, C&S does not place any "ethical question marks . . . [on] ethnic diversity as a basic foundation [grondslag] for social analysis, ethics and theology" (Kinghorn 1989, 35)

In consequence, C&S (1986) rejects apartheid not as "an unjust [veronregende] system in itself" but only in so far "as it (perhaps) brought about injustice in practice" (Kinghorn 1989, 35). This, Kinghorn claims, does not entail a dramatic paradigm shift as some claim.

On the other hand, many would agree that C&S abridges and modifies HRLS’ doctrine of the formation of ethno-linguistic "peopleness" [volksverband] in Scripture (e.g., Raath 1990 [exclusivist] and Kinghorn 1990a [inclusivist]). The modifications, however, are of critical importance. Nowhere does C&S attribute any foundational normativity [grondwaarheid] to the continued existence of ethno-covenantal bonds as HRLS does (see Potgieter 1990, 24).

Raath, for example, specifically faults the older document, HRLS, at several points, however he stresses that its exegesis of Genesis 10-11 is "especially important" (Raath 1990, 48). The reason is that HRLS

In contrast to HRLS, covenantal exclusivists such as Raath claim that C&S does not attribute any intrinsic value [geen eie waarde] nor special calling to a people as a whole (Raath 1990, 48). Raath, as a prototypical covenantal exclusivist, believes that "peoples" are found in the creation-providential order. Since therefore all things in the first creation are specifically called "good" (Ge 1:31), "peopleness" does indeed have unique value [eie waarde] (see also Potgieter 1990, 28).

The best of the covenantal exclusivist, however, do not believe that this concept of created ethnicity "must be understood as a static concept." They would agree that many peoples have been formed and destroyed over the ages (Potgieter 1990, 26).

In the ethnic theologian’s view, thus, each volk’s language and culture is a unique sphere, sovereignly formed by God. The Afrikaner and all other peoples are to be protected and built up under the calling of God, to his glory.

Thus, many exclusivists and even some non-exclusivist, Dooyeweerdians claim C&S is indifferent to God’s providential care of peopleness. They believe C&S implies that God is not concerned whether a people ends or even diminishes its unique ethnic existence nor whether a volk should lose its unique sense of godly calling as an ethnic collective. Exclusivists fault C&S for finding no conflict between this "value-free" perspective on continued existence of ethno-covenantal groups and "God’s creation mandate to form [unique] culture" (Raath 1990, 49, see also Boshoff 1987, Smith 1988, Potgieter 1990).

Faith and Protest (F&P), produced by NGK dissenters, agrees with the exegesis of HRLS on the connection of the Cultural Mandate and the Babel pericope. The Abrahamic Covenant (Ge 12), immediately following the Babel pericope (Ge 10-11), it teaches, means that the church of Christ is gathered out of all peoples to be the people of his possession.

F&P is correct in pointing out that this doctrine does not imply that the New Covenant "people" must of necessity be a totally-new people stripped of former bonds of language and culture. Instead, according to F&P, the people of God as the church of Christ exist in a diversity of confessional churches within the unity of one invisible church, the Kingdom of God (F&P, 1.7, 1.10).

Therefore, congregations and denominations must be indigenous in language and customs (F&P, 1.9, 1.15). This gives allowance, F&P believes, for separate churches within and for every people. In other words, each volk as a created ethno-covenantal solidarity within the covenantally diverse unity of the one People of God, must have their own church.

Emeritus, NGK missiology professor, C. W. H. Boshoff’s informed defense of this theme is also significant. He shows that the church is not an association of individuals in which each member must put off or even deny his national and ethnic identity, color or culture. The one church, thus, has "many forms" [veelvormig] (Boshoff 1987, 3), a term used extensively by Abraham Kuyper and his disciples.

As a consequence, Boshoff claims that it is false to say that the NGK’s earlier policy of separate ethnic churches was motivated by blatant racism. He cites Synod documents and several works of earlier NGK missiologists to substantiate this. His conclusion is that "language and culture" and the desire to plant indigenous, three-self churches was the major motivation, not mere color (Boshoff 1987, 15).

Analysis and Evaluation

Boshoff’s evaluation seems accurate on the official synodical level. However, it does not explain why both HRLS and popular opinion in the church makes race a crude, ethno-covenantal demarcation indicator. Boshoff does not deal seriously enough with the syncretism factor in HRLS.

Secondly, F&P’s conclusion about church diversity also seems correct. Union with Christ is not equal to membership in a specific, unified, visible, institutional denomination (F&P, 1.11). The NGK is not the church of Christ. Furthermore, F&P is correct in stating that no one is obligated by God to abandon his cultural customs in order to become a Christian (F&P, 1.13).

This lends itself to two correct applications with which this reviewer agrees. First, the universal church is obligated to plant indigenous churches in every people on earth (F&P, 5.7). Second, indigenizing the church in each ethno-covenantal group is not an incidental, non-essential matter alongside of the most important matter in mission, that of church unity. This, F&P claims, is what C&S implies (F&P, 5.11).

On the other hand, however, when exclusive church theologians criticize C&S for overemphasizing unity at the expense of ethno-covenantal diversity in the church, they seem to make an illogical, anti-biblical jump. To equate good, ethnic diversity and the necessity of indigenous churches with exclusive mono-racial, totally separate churches is a non-sequiter. On these anti-biblical grounds, the apartheid theologians behind F&P, for example, would exclude some races from the uniting table of the Lord in their congregation and from certain divine worship services (see F&P, 1.8, 1.9, 1.22, 1.31).

Extreme exclusivist theologians want a complete and non-biblical separation of believers based upon created, and hence good, ethnic diversity. This is indeed a perversion of the doctrines of the covenant and of creation. Furthermore, strict exclusivists accuse C&S of espousing a doctrine of unity which will end up "forc[ing] believers from various churches [to gather] visibly together in one meeting and even into one congregation (C&S [1986] 75, 76, 90, 92, 93, 270, 273)" (F&P, 1.27). This is manifestly false. C&S tries to carefully provide for the pastoral needs of each language group (though not as adequately as it should).

Lastly, on the ground of good, ethnic diversity, F&P illogically criticizes C&S for not banning interracial (but not inter-Euro-ethnic) marriages (F&P, 4.6) [exactly as did HRLS]. Therefore, for the extreme exclusivist, race is wrongly equated with created volksverband or ethno-covenantal solidarity.

HRLS was an example of the Kuyperian principle that once the "different life spheres" are freed from church domination, they can "function in accord with the ‘common grace’ accessible to all in creation" (Ellingsen 1988). Potgieter, writing in critique of C&S, expresses the old consensus well. Citing Bavinck, he states: "The Bible is the norma normans for the whole life" (Potgieter 1990, 39; emphasis in original). Whenever it comes into contact with any topic, the Bible gives unchanging principles for that area of study.

Ellingsen claims that the result of this Kuyperian view was that the former relationship between the NGK, the Afrikaner people, and the National Party government may have been "one of the closest parallels to a theocracy that exists in the twentieth century Western World" (Ellingsen 1988, 240).

NG Sendingkerk Professor, Jaap Durand, speaks disparagingly of the Kuyperian’s determination to apply "biblical principles " to the "social spheres of the people’s life [volkslewe] in South Africa" (Durand 1985, 41-42). He claims that a false view of Scripture was the main reason that NGK Kuyperians, who dominated the church from the thirties to the mid-seventies, could and would not oppose apartheid social theology. That false view had two aspects: (1) a "biblicistic approach" to Scripture which opposes higher critical reconstructions of historical situation or redactional context; and (2) one which insists upon the "the idea that the Word of God contains eternal and unchanging norms or ‘principles’ for the whole of life" (Durand 1985, 42).

The reason the Kuyperians would developed HRLS’ type of theology could not oppose apartheid, he claims, was simple. "Once certain principles have been established as biblical, opposition to those principles can easily be seen as opposition to the Bible itself" (Durand 1985, 42).

In contrast to HRLS, however, several scholars allege that C&S gives no principial models or blueprints for social structures. For example, C. Villa-Vicencio, Professor of Religious Studies at UCT, alleges that C&S makes the "decision not to provide theological sanction for any political model" (Villa-Vicencio 1986, 11; see also Pickus 1990 for the same sentiment). In other words, "the Bible provides no blueprint for the resolution of social, economic, or political issues" (Villa-Vicencio 1986, 9). Biblical Studies Professor (US), Johan Kinghorn, concurs: "Therefore, C[&]S will no longer play politics and will thus not busy itself with timeless rules on the structure of the order of society as does HRLS" (Kinghorn 1989, 36).

These scholars seem to believe that the NGK has retreated from a culture-changing, social theology. This approach to theology, they believe, holds certain dangers. Rejecting biblical principles applicable to all of life means that the NGK was falling into the trap of "not resisting a theology of privatized religion that finds it impossible to provide biblical or theological justification for any political program" (Villa-Vicencio 1986, 12).

Villa-Vicencio further accuses the NGK of willingly advocating "this form of religious quietism" because the

Kinghorn subtly agrees. "In a totally politicized context . . . any standpoint is political." Therefore, "an apparently a-political standpoint is then nothing other than a direct support of the ruling politics" (Kinghorn 1989, 36).

At the same time, however, Kinghorn also concedes a crucial bit of "hope" in this shift away from HRLS’ Kuyperianism:

In conclusion, therefore, C&S’ retreatist, ecclesiocentric perspective in some its sections does not logically lead to the conclusion that the whole C&S supports the entrenchment of the status quo. The opposite could be true. An a-political standpoint in certain sections could also mean subtle support for non-status quo, political thought depending on what the normative presuppositions of other key sections of the document may support. C&S seems, therefore, to desire two contradictory things. First, it wants to withdraw from prescribing political models. It also, however, wants to remain in the political arena with an ecclesiatical voice. For this reason, Smit accuses it of "speaking out of both sides of its mouth" (Smit 1989, 56).

P. J. Strauss concludes that the NGK has not become socio-politically neutral as some sections of C&S claim, but actually has imbedded within it specific, implicit and explicit models for church-political and church-state relations. Strauss alleges that C&S (1990) is giving the ruling National Party, most of whom are NGK members, a Scriptural justification for the political-constitutional changes that were then occurring.

In other words, just as the NGK was accused of being an ideological co-creator with the National Party of the apartheid model for church and society, so Strauss is claiming that the NGK is a ideological co-creator with the National Party (and other players such as the ANC and the SACC) of the new South African church and social order. The implication is that the NGK is captive of a new ideology.

Carel W. H. Boshoff summarizes a perspective similar to that which Kinghorn, Villa-Vicencio and Strauss notice. C&S, he writes, claims that Scripture cannot give any prescriptive political models for the socio-political relationship between peoples. It only gives "clear guidelines" against which every human interrelationship must be tested (Boshoff 1987, 24). Thus guidelines for inter-individual behavior must serve as guidelines for inter-group and inter-volk relationships. This, Boshoff claims, is faulty reasoning.

The implication of this is far-reaching. "Under the pretension that no [socio-political] model can be prescribed," the social model of one country, with one nation, one citizenship and one government, "is in reality sanctioned." This comes with the demand that the change process in that direction must be completed (Boshoff 1987, 24; emphasis in original). He cites C&S (1986), 338 as support. It claims that the human right of any individual is negatively effected by the denial of suffrage.

In line with its many "ambiguities and contradictions," Villa-Vicencio eventually also confesses that C&S does give an implicit Scriptural social blueprint. Even from his inclusivist perspective, he still winds up claiming that "many of the cardinal theological principles found in the report are acceptable and pleasing" (Villa-Vicencio 1986, 9).

Summary

In summary, then, social models or blueprints are inescapable. Dooyeweerdian sociologist, H. J. Smith agrees: "Any attempt at social analysis uses a model." So does C&S (Smith 1988, 11). Dooyeweerdians and exclusivists claim the social model C&S uses is actually based on a Barthian, nature-grace distinction. Villa-Vicencio claims it is a pietistic dualism (Villa-Vicencio 1986). Both types of dualism either support the status quo or they support unifying social systems. Dualism, hence, as a presupposition is not socially neutral.

Therefore this reviewer concludes, the NGK is not taking a neutral stand on political models as C&S claims. To cover up this lack of real neutrality, C&S is ambiguous at important points and sometimes speaks with a "double meaning" (Boshoff 1987, 27).

C&S Compromises with Human Rights Social Blueprint

In principle, then, because there is no social neutrality, there are only two alternatives when biblically based "blueprint" are rejected. The first is to syncretize biblical concepts with humanistic content. The second is to adopt a blatantly man-centered, humanistic conceptual model. Both are in fact actually humanistic because the actual meaning content of both is derived from humanist wisdom.

As seen, C&S desires to be biblical. Hence because it rejects biblical blueprints, its implicit or explicit social model must be syncretistic. HRLS seems to be syncretized with racist and idealist worldviews, both in themselves profoundly humanistic. In its turn, several allege C&S is syncretized with social democratic, human rights ideology.

Potgieter (1990), S. A. Strauss, and others, claim that C&S’ view of Scripture is guilty of compromise with modern, democratic humanist philosophy. S.A. Strauss sees "an ethically, subjective tendency" in C&S which leads to an "anthropocentric reduction of the appeal to the Bible" (Strauss 1987, 19). He means that in its doctrinal-normative sections, C&S never speaks about objective, ethical norms for social structures. The only norms mentioned are those applicable to "interpersonal relations within social structures" (Strauss 1987, 3).

This individualism, he implies, is not classically Reformed. Reformed social theology points both to the biblical ordering of interpersonal relationships as well as to the "orderly structuring of social bonds" (Strauss 1987, 3). This ethical reductionism, he claims, is derived from modern subjectivism in theology. Like the inclusivists, he also sees pietistic thought patterns evident in C&S’ greater emphasis upon interpersonal ethics than upon biblical norms for social structures (Strauss 1987, 4).

Furthermore, S. A. Strauss claims to find in C&S’ doctrine of man (anthropology) "humanistic influences via modern theology." He especially sees this in C&S’ discussion of rights derived from the image of God. This humanism is manifested in an "optimistic view of humanity in which the effects of the Fall are underestimated" (Strauss 1987, 19). Strauss stresses that this over-optimism seems to be derived from the influence of the post-war theology of Karl Barth. Barthianism claims that God in Christ has once and for all said "yes" to humanity. This is a form of the universal redemption doctrine (Strauss 1987, 14).

P. J. Strauss, follows up on both themes mentioned above. First of all, he shows that C&S (1990) claims that the church, that is its officers, can never use the Bible as a "handbook" or "recipe book" for political models. Ironically, C&S also indicates that Scripture gives general norms and standards valid for society. However, it never gives practical, hermeneutical principles indicating "how the church should arrive at certain biblical demands or generally valid norms" (Strauss 1992, 946). There is, therefore, no "analytical discussion" of whether some of the norms C&S (1990) uses are derived from Scripture or from extra-biblical convictions (Strauss 1992, 946).

As a consequence, social reformation is "reduced [in C&S] to certain subjective . . . rights in which neighbor love and respect for common humanity [medemenslikheid] must penetrate." These general principles, P. J. Strauss alleges, will not lead to structural reformation of social spheres "most likely because [C&S teaches that] direct Biblical prescriptions in that context don’t exist" (Strauss 1992, 949; emphasis added).

P. J. Strauss notes here a fundamental contradiction. The Bible does not give biblical prescriptions for the social order, except that civil rulers must enforce certain human rights (see C&S, 289ff). This author has also pointed out this contradiction (Kreitzer 1993).

Some inclusivist critics, J. Kinghorn (Kinghorn 1989, 1990a), W. Nicol (Nicol 1989), and W. Boesak (Boesak 1989) do not agree with these Dooyeweerdian and ethnic exclusivist scholars. They believe that C&S does includes a profound, social ethical paradigm shift in at least the section on human rights. This shift, however, is contradicted in the paragraphs dealing with apartheid. Writing about C&S (1986), they believe that it’s apartheid doctrine is no better than that of the best exclusivists’ teaching. They contend that the 1986 Synod’s desire was merely to tinker with the more odious forms of Jim Crow-type legislation. It did not reject either grand apartheid’s division of the land into ethnic homelands nor the division of residential areas and schools on ethno-racial lines.

This critique is to a great extent true. C&S appears be an fairly unstable, consensus document. Several scholars from differing perspectives assert this problem of internal contradiction (see e.g., Boshoff 1986; Ellingsen 1988; Smit 1989).

In summary, then, many inclusivists admit that the implications of the radical normative sections and the section on human rights show that C&S has "departed from the apartheid model in more than merely a cosmetic way" (Horn 1989, 54). However, this departure is only moderately applied in the application section.

Few critics of C&S give a specific biblical alternative to either the exclusivists’ or inclusivists’ solutions to South Africa’s ethnic relations problems. Inclusivists claim that petty, discriminatory apartheid is evil. They base this judgment upon an appeal to the superiority of social unity with its corollary, equality. Exclusivists make an appeal to the equal goodness of both unity and diversity. Both sides, however, appeal to non-specific, summarizing commands of Scripture: (1) the command of neighbor love, and (2) the command to practice "equity [billikheid] and just evenhandedness [regverdigheid]" (Potgieter 1990, 16). Both interpret these norms within the framework of their own presuppositions.

Exclusivists Over-Emphasize Diversity

In their general appeal to the Trinitarian principle, exclusivists have manifested a practical over-emphasis on ethno-racial diversity. The lack of a specific, universally valid check on a theoretically valid, Trinitarian presupposition, gave Afrikaner controlled civil and church governments a virtual, blank check to develop race segregating church and societal structures.

To their credit, some exclusivist critics of C&S, such as Raath and Potgieter, reject some of the "great abuses" of apartheid springing from the unbalanced emphasis on diversity. The best of these exclusivists wanted police enforcement of apartheid structures as well as interpersonal relations within these structures to be improved according to biblical guidelines. One reason why this made little impact is that exclusivist critics of apartheid abuses neglected to detail what specific, universally valid, biblical law-principles define the abuses of ethno-racial separation (apartheid).

As a result, exclusivist, apartheid social theology remains unequally yoked to two types of separation. It marries the defense of petty apartheid (e.g., racially separate amenities, legally segregated neighborhoods and schools, etc.) to the defense of grand apartheid (ethnic homelands). Petty apartheid is morally reprehensible according to the ger laws of the Pentateuch. Partition into homelands, however, can, at least theoretically, be justly defended using the biblical principia established by HRLS.

Inclusivists’ Over-emphasize Unity

The inclusivists with their non-specific, dualist-inspired principles, over-emphasize unity and social equality. These are the two basic presuppositions of those scholars within the NGK who advocate a inclusivist, Social Democratic social model for church and society (see e.g., Lategan, Kinghorn, et al 1987, König 1989b, Nicol 1989, and Kinghorn 1990b).

Neither the exclusivists nor the inclusivists have developed specific Biblical checks upon their system by means of the universally valid equity of God’s law. Neither give specific biblical, legal guidelines concerning when "separating" legislation is just or oppressive.

This is an major lacuna in the social thinking of both exclusivists and inclusivists. Both resort to extra-biblical presuppositions to support their positions. The inclusivists have a tendency to pejoratively write off the presuppositions of the exclusivists as "racist" and "ideologically prejudiced." The exclusivist claim the inclusivists are deeply influenced by contemporary humanism. There is some truth in both criticisms. Since C&S shows the influence of both parties in the church, it shows both weaknesses in its social-ethical system.