CHAPTER TWELVE
THE UNIVERSAL EQUITY PRINCIPLE, PART TWO

Yahweh’s Tôrâh is Comprehensive

The Israelite’s common legal system binding individual, family, "church," and state was not limited to mere individual and inter-personal ethics. It extended to all other spheres of life including the ethical norms governing inter-ethnic relationships. Modern Christocratic constitutional and legal orders, when God is pleased to restore Christian civil governors to the earth, must also be as wholistic.

William Dryness, in his Themes in Old Testament Theology, states the following about the divne tôrâh.

Perhaps Eichrodt means by a "healthy sense of justice," a Spirit taught sense of justice informed by the wise principles found in each specific case of the law. If so, then this sense of justice is similar to what this dissertation believes is meaning of the transculturally valid, "general equity" of the judicial law as taught by the Westminster Confession.

Yahweh’s Judicials Never Intended to be

Time and Culture Bound

God thus never intended the judicial laws, both in their apodictic and casuistic forms, to be a time and culture bound anachronisms with no binding moral authority for today.

This dissertation neo-Puritan perspective also accepts the correlative proposition. God intended both the apodictic and the casuistic laws of the Mosaic judicials to be concrete, culturally enclothed applications of the wise and just morality flowing from God’s nature.

The wise morality of God is summarized by the Ten Commandments but not exhausted by those Ten Words. Thus the ethics of the Tôrâh affects every area of life in and through the concrete illustrations of that tôrânic instruction in the judicial law (both apodictic and casuistic).

Two Representative Scholars on the Purpose

of the Tôrâh

Many scholars from different parts of the theological spectrum are beginning to see the comprehensive relevance of all of the tôrâh-wisdom of God, found throughout Scripture but certainly also in the legal sections of the Pentateuch.

For example, the late Professor of Bible at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Umberto Cassuto, points out that the "legal sections of the Pentateuch should not be regarded as a code of [civil] laws, or even as a number of different codes" (Cassuto 1967, 262). He gives several reasons for this.

First, "the statutes of the Torah are not to be identified with Israel’s secular legislation" (Cassuto 1967, 262). The implication was that there was already in existence a "general legal tradition" or common law of nations, to use Calvin’s term, "throughout the ancient East" (Cassuto 1967, 262). Furthermore, there existed a body of secular law among the Israelites themselves (citing 1Sa 30:24-25) which theoretically was to be based on justice (Isa 10:1-4 [forbids making new laws contrary to eternal principles of justice; an example of this type of law-practice is Jer 38:8ff]).

Third, the Tôrâh does not deal with many subjects normally associated with complete civil law codes such as "laws of marriage," apart from incest and bride-price; or "laws of divorce, which are mentioned only incidentally in order to forbid, on moral grounds," a remarried divorced woman returning to her former husband; the laws of theft, etc. (Cassuto 1967, 262-263).

Third, Mosaic laws differ from a body of civil law because the former are not always in the form of a "complete statute." In other words, they do not always give a penalty to be imposed (Cassuto 1967, 263). Instead they give an absolute, unchanging value, that is "unconditional, categorical directives" (Klein, Blomberg, and Hubbard 1993, 276).. This is called the apodictic (or "apodeictic") form of many Israelite laws, something unique with that nation (Alt 1966, 110). Furthermore, sometimes Yahweh adds a reason for a command, again unique to Israel. Also unique was the intermixing of "religious and ritual regulations alongside legal ordinances without differentiation" (Cassuto 1967, 263). The Tôrâh was a complex, interwoven whole.

Cassuto thus concludes that the "Torah statutes are only notes on the existing laws" of nations including the Israelite nation (Cassuto 1967, 263). They are defined as "religious and ethical instructions in judicial matters" ordained in the name of Yahweh, the God of all the earth and especially of Israel. They consist of three types: (1) amendments to existing legal tradition, (2) those commands which reject or "invalidate particular aspects" of ancient law, (3) those that "confirm" in the name of Yahweh those aspects of the tradition that "are deemed worthy of express corroboration" (Cassuto 1967, 262).

These three types of law assume that magistrates could enact laws but only the "Torah sets bounds to this right from a religious viewpoint" (Cassuto 1967, 262). In other words, a wise and godly judge (see Dt 1:15-18, 16:18-20, 17:8-13) was to use the tôrânic wisdom to enact a complete civil law code. The divine statutes were to be the just "right and left" bounds within which the people and their rulers were to live (see Dt 5:32, 17:8-11).

Another example of those grappling with the wisdom of the biblical law are two scholars from a totally different part of the theological spectrum. Progressive dispensationalist authors, Gordon Fee and Douglas Stuart, speak about an apodictic law (Lev 19:13-14). They see universal, binding, moral authority in every one of these judicial laws:

Fee and Stuart rightly see the universal applicability of the apodictic laws, most of which are not repeated in the New Testament. Even in their discussion of the casuistic laws, supposedly not directly applicable to contemporary ethnoculture, they see much helpful insight for today.

Using slavery as an example, they claim these principles are "valuable lessons for us" even though the law of slavery is not "directly to us." We learn about God, his demands of "fairness," as well as "His ideals for Israelite society." All of this is the background for the meaning of "redemption" (Fee and Stuart 1982, 142-43).

The obvious question, then, is, why cannot these laws be the source of direct and specific direction for contemporary society’s treatment of prisoners, for example. This is the closest analogy to slavery in our culture and many contemporary cultures. Why should a contemporary Christian a priori write off any part of the judicial law as "obviously not a command from God to us" (Fee and Stuart 1982, 143). If the laws tell us something of God’s justice, wise ideals, and background for new covenant redemption, why are they not directly applicable to us, stripped of non-universal, cultural forms?

Covenantal and Ethical Continuity Between Testaments

as Hermeneutical Key

Concerning the contemporary application and use of the principles of justice in the judicial laws, therefore, the most basic question seems to be not whether the judicials may be used but how much of the judicial law applies to every culture of the earth. The second question then is what hermeneutical tools can be used to separate the universally binding, that is the transcultural application from the culturally specific and temporal in the judicials?

Before these questions can be addressed, it is appropriate to review the two basic approaches this whole issue has spawned over the centuries (see Covenant Principle). The two main approaches are (1) covenantal, continuity and (2) the dispensational, discontinuity position (see Kaiser 1987, 147). Each viewpoint has spawned a number of moderating positions. This dissertation is most interested in the continuity position.

The continuity position assumes the unity of the people of God throughout the ages (BC, art. 27; WCF 19, 25). This means that God’s covenant of grace and the ethic flowing from that covenant are unified. On the other hand, there are two administrations of that one covenant (BC, art. 25; WCF, 19.3). Therefore, all the law is binding for the contemporary church except that which is changed or abrogated in New Testament by Christ and/or His apostles and prophets (Eph 2:20).

Ethical Continuity Position of Theonomy

An attempt to be logically consistent with this continuity assumption is the Theonomist, Greg L. Bahnsen (1984, 1985, 1991). The following summarizes his position (Bahnsen 1985, 345-347):

(1) Justification by faith alone. (2) and (3) Sola Scriptura:

(4) Presume covenantal continuity of ethics of the Kingdom ("standing laws") unless later revelation rescinds or modifies previous decrees. (5) The superiority of the new covenant. The old Covenant was a shadow of the New "thereby changing the application of sacrificial, purity, and ‘separation’ principles, redefining the people of God, and altering the significance of the promised land." (6) God’s laws reflect God’s unchanging character. (7) "Christian . . . politics calls for recognition of God’s . . . law as a standard by which to judge all social codes." (8) Every civil magistrates is God’s minister, "avenging divine wrath against criminals and giving an account on the Final Day." (9) God’s one law applies to every area of life not just personal ethics. (10) The civil precepts "are a model of perfect social justice for all cultures, even in the punishment of criminals."

Consistent Covenantal Positions Hold to Ethical

Continuity

A classic Reformed perspective that desires to be faithful to the Confessions, finds little in the first nine points concerning ethical and covenantal continuity with which to disagree. As has been seen in the previous chapter and will be seen further in this chapter, however, the classic Reformed position will have diverse opinions on the last half of point ten (penology).

For example, Westminster Seminary professor, Vern Poythress, in The Shadow of Christ in the Law of Moses, modifies points 4, 6, 9, 10; rightly making them more Christocentric. However, in the end, Poythress has little quarrel with the ten points except in the area of penology (point 10). He does not, then, "favor [a] . . . straight-line, direct enforcement of a large class of Old Testament [especially penal] laws today" (Poythress 1991, 343). He concludes, thus, that "theonomy" differs from "most other Reformed Christianity" mainly over whether the Mosaic penalties should be "exactly matched in form and in intensity by modern penalties." Apart from penology, he states, "it is not clear how theonomy as a whole differs decisively from the rest of Reformed thought" (Poythress 1991, 356).

Among contemporary Reformed scholars, Bahnsen accurately points out that C. Wright and W. Kaiser’s continuity positions are most similar to his own though also disagreeing with Theonomy on penology (Bahnsen 1991a). This dissertation’s neo-Puritan standard basically agrees with these two scholars criticisms of Theonomy without discounting several key insights of the theonomic school on penology. (See chapter one for further critique of Theonomy).

In summary, the basic discussion can be refined further to hermeneutical questions concerning (1) that which is the culturally relative "form," enclothing the just and universal principles in the judicial laws, and (2) how much of the Old Covenant’s ethic is rescinded or modified by New Testament teaching itself. Question two assumes, agreeing with Bahnsen’s fifth principle, that the New Testament must interpret and regulate the Old.

Biblical Presupposition of Continuity

As discussed previously, Scripture itself teaches an ethical continuity position between Covenants. This dissertation’s neo-Puritan standard, therefore, presupposes that as the inheritor of all the peoples of the earth (Ps 2), Christ’s commands are the same as the law of Yahweh and as such are the law of the earth (Mt 28:18-20; Mt 5:17-20). Therefore, we must handle His law-wisdom with much respect (see also Ps 2):

Creational Form as Hermeneutical Key

William Larkin introduces this crucial area of discussion:

This dissertation uses the terms "creational forms" and "creation design norms" for these prescribed creation social forms and standards. The discussion of these transculturally valid creational forms is founded upon specific Scriptural presuppositions flowing out of the Recapitulative, Eschatology of Victory Principle.

First, is Creator-creature distinction. He has created each diverse physical object, creature, and person separate and distinct from Himself and all other objects. He gave Adam [thus mankind] the authority and ability to distinguish (i.e., name or categorize) the objective, external, and distinct things of creation.

In other words, men are not so immersed in culture that they cannot be self-transcendent and hence discern absolute unchanging truth without any distortion. Men can see eternal truth in the whole of the Bible as Paul states: "These things happened to them as examples and were written down as warnings for us" (1Co 10:6-12; see Ro 15:4; 2Ti 3:16-17).

Certainly men have the ability to distort reality. This is caused primarily by sin, not of necessity always by man’s minds as an instrument, though this sometimes occurs (see Larkin 1992, 297-299; Ro 1:20ff). Thus as Larkin states:

Therefore, "If the one message is applicable to all cultures, the language in which it was revealed must not have cultural conditionedness as its basic characteristic (Larkin 1992, 228). Each culture is not an exclusive box serving as a barrier to cross-cultural communication. Least of all is the Hebrew culture, in which the casuistic and apodictic laws are enclothed, such as delimiting box.

There are thus several creational forms, universal and common to all men which limit the cultural exclusiveness of biblical law. Hiebert summarizes:

Larkin also stresses this theme:

Larkin continues, discussing the principle that God has created the husband and father with the status of leader and head in the family and church. Men, of course together with their wives, are commanded to "transmit [to the next generation] the God ordained cultural beliefs, values, tasks, and behavior patterns (Eph. 5:28-29, 6:4; Deut. 6:6-9 [case law])." Wives are commanded to be their husband’s helper, whereas the children are commanded to obedient to both (Larkin 1992, 203).

Examples of Creation Forms and Design-Norms

Cultural universals (creational design norms) are always based on clearly discernible creational forms (see Larkin 1992, 203; Kaiser 1983, 81ff; Lee n.d.). This dissertation suggests several other creational forms and design-norms (see also Larkin 1992, 195-6, 201-2). Note that there is an intimate connection between the moral standards of the Decalogue and these creational givens (Kaiser 1984, 81ff; Lee n.d.; see Kaiser 1983, 31 for further discussion of creation forms and corresponding design norms):

1) God alone is to be worshipped and obeyed: The Creator-creature distinction (1st and 2d commandment; Ro 1:18ff).

2) Gender identity: The adultery and homosexuality prohibitions presuppose the existence of only two genders: male and female (7th commandment; Lev 18:22; Ro 1:24-27; 1Co 6:9; 1Ti 1:10; Rev 22:15).

3) Female and male interdependence (1Co 11:11-12). Male servant leadership from creation priority (1Co 11:7-10; 1Ti 2:11-14). Wife as Helper (Ge 2:18, 20); children as obedient (see also Eph 5:20-6:2; Col 3;18-21; 1Pe 3:1-7).

4) Male lineage (patrilineality: name, house, and inheritance comes from the fathers [see Pr 13:22, 19:14]).

5) Monogamous, faithful marriage (7th commandment; Mt 19:4-8).

6) One day in seven rest (Ge 2:2; 4th commandment; Ex 31:17).

7) Private ownership of property under the Sovereign Ownership of the Creator (Lev 25:23; Ps 24:1; 8th and 10th commandments; 1Co 10:26).

8) Liberty of person under God: One must not become a slave of anyone or substance except God (8th commandment; Ex 21:16; Dt 24:7; 1Co 6:12, 7:23; Ro 13:8; Pr 22:7).

9) Necessity of truth corresponding to reality and necessity of faithfulness to an oath and/or contract (3d and 9th commandments).

10) Separate, God-created languages and ethno-linguistic solidarities flowing from this (implicit in 4th commandment; Ge 10-11; Dt 32:8; Ps 86:9; Ac 17:26) and the biblical, satanic and human inspired cultural forms flowing from distinct language and faith.

A second foundational presupposition is that the most important cultural system in which human beings are placed is a spiritual system. In other words, man has been created to grope after God even though none actually do (Ac 17:27; Ro 3:9ff). Larkin comments:

This brings us to the answer to several questions and problems concerning the cross-cultural application of Old Testament ethics. Some accuse the Scripture, especially the Old Testament laws, of irrelevance to contemporary ethnocultures alleged huge cultural gap between the present and the ancient cultures.

However, the law speaks to many common creational situations in human culture with norms based on the ten moral categories of the Ten Words. These commandments, we have seen, both summarize the moral law and are based on the eternal character and Trinitarian interaction of the Godhead. Thus in these common creational situations the laws be normative cross-culturally.

Others, such as Karl Barth, accuse the Scripture, especially the Old Testament individual and social norms of "irrelevance [as] . . . the present price of specificity." Thus existential scholars warn against proof-texting to prove sin in the present context (Goldingay 1981, 52-53). However, as Goldingay suggests, a specific command may enclothe "the concrete expression of some [transculturally valid] principle" (Goldingay 1981, 53).

Kaiser believes that Barth falsely made "generality," in the sense of indefinite or ambiguous, the equivalent of "universality" in common with Barth’s philosophical monistic assumptions. Actually "universal" is opposite to "particular" or "local" not "specific/specificity" (Kaiser 1983, 25).

Kaiser discusses the wonderful specificity of many of the commands of Scripture:

Others accuse the Scripture of such cultural boundedness it cannot speak with absolute unchanging truth cross-culturally. Even such evangelically oriented linguists and communications scholars as Eugene Nida and Charles Kraft "maintain that revelation consists in God’s dynamic acts and not in language" (Larkin 1992, 230). This, however, destroys the Scriptural perspicuity which is a foundational element of the Reformation’s sola Scriptura doctrine. This destroys Scriptures singular meaning and its authorially intended authority (WCF, 1.9).

First, the Scripture sees no contradiction between a inscripturated message "alive with meaning for every age" and a "meaning that remains single and fixed according to God’s intention as he first gave it" (Larkin 1992, 251-252). Peter (1:24-25) cites Isaiah (40:6-7) to show that the creation will fade and fail, but the "word of the Lord abides forever."

It is that word, Peter says, which causes us to be born again. The promise and command of God is living and powerful, more than a "two edged sword," the author of Hebrews states in agreement (Heb 4:12f). God is the source of the true words of Scripture, that is the Old Testament (2Ti 3:16; Jn 17:17), not changing man and his cultural context. God, therefore, is the guarantor of its single, fixed authorially intended meaning (Larkin 1992, 252).

Therefore, "since its single meaning — truth — gives life, that meaning must remain the same in order to continue its life-changing work" (see Jn 6:68) throughout the ages and in every ethnoculture of the world now and in the future (Larkin 1992, 252). This includes the Mosaic judicials.

If locus and source of meaning were in the constantly changing ethno-cultural context, then there would be no meaning at all for any command of Scripture. Literary critic Hirsh agrees:

The New Testament cites

As we have seen, the Bible itself teaches the eternality and justice of its own Mosaic commands, including the judicial case laws (Ps 119:89).

Thus the view that the cultural context must "never be employed to limit or undercut the authoritative claims of Scripture" (Larkin 1992, 261). Note that Jesus criticized the Pharisees for overturning the clear teaching of Scripture by extra-Biblical material, in their case the cultural traditions of the elders (see Mt 15:5ff).

Furthermore, it is necessary to see that Scripture makes a clear distinction between meaning and significance (Larkin 1992, 262). In other words, a case law may mean something specific (i.e., refer to some person, situation, or thing in the external world) in a literary context but still have a much broader significance in terms of principle enclothed in the specific case (see Larkin’s discussion 1992, 262-3). Larkin gives the example of Christ commanding the Pharisees to learn the meaning and apply the significance of "I desire compassion not sacrifice" Mt 9:13/Hos 6:6 (Larkin 1992, 262).

This is exactly the point of Christ’s discussion of the eternal validity of the whole of the law, even its small details (see Mt 5:17-18; Lk 16:17). Kaiser strongly affirms that

In these passages, Kaiser states, "our Lord does not give even the slightest degree of comfort to the position that the NT is the hermeneutical divide in determining for contemporary readers the proper quotient and its remainder from the OT revelation" (Kaiser 1987, 96).

Therefore the Bible is unique, final and complete authority, the beginning point of wisdom and its ending. It is the touchstone. No words are to be added to it nor are any to be taken away (Dt 4:2; Pr 30:6; Rev 22:18; Larkin 1992, 271). All of God’s laws are authoritative.

Many theologians and missiologists such as Charles Kraft (1979) and Allan Johnson (1984) claim that only an abstract, earthly-formless "meaning" is binding cross-culturally but never a physical form. This denies the validity of a creation design-norm in a manner very similar to Karl Barth’s neo-orthodoxy. Thus any teaching can be made "cultural" and the cultural tradition then comes above the clear commands of God. This seems to be similar to Pharisaical exegesis (see Mt 15:3ff).

Larkin agrees that this approach denies the Sola Scriptura Principle’s concept of biblical authority:

J. R. McQuilken from Columbia International University believes the opposite perspective. He "treats both form and meaning as normative" (Larkin 1992, 314). Allan Johnson rejects this perspective because it elevates sometimes repressive (by modern equalitarian standards) cultural forms to the level of absolute norms. This he calls "cultural fundamentalism" (Johnson 1984).

The Reformation’s answer is again the Sola Scriptura Principle: the Scripture judges itself, not the autonomous reasonings of individual or collective man. Scripture must be carefully searched to see where it changes cultural forms. For example, death by "stoning" in the Mosaic economy is the equivalent to death by the "sword" in the Roman Imperium [Ro 13:4]). (See discussion on the principles of "non-normativeness" or cultural specificness [Larkin 1992, 314-318]).

A third approach to finding the transcultural meaning of a case law is to use a functional, cultural equivalent "form" as an replacement if it carries the same meaning. This process is illegitimate if a creation design-form is at stake. However, it can be used for other non-creational forms such as shaving the head for mourning (Dt 21:11-14), putting on sack cloth and ashes along with tearing the clothes as a sign of repentance, etc. that have no absolute creational form behind them (see Larkin 1992, 315).

Thus the meaning of "mourning" in Dt 21:11-14 is creational. As is the one month period of time. All peoples everywhere mourn the dead. Many, however, mourn excessively and morbidly, thus the limit on time is kind and gracious. However, the culturally relative forms of shaving the head and/or beard, trimming nails and skin hair are applicable to only certain cultures (Isa 7:20, 15:2; Jer 16:6, 41:5, 47:5, 48:37; Eze 27:31).

The "mourning of repentance" is also transcultural but not the external expression of it (see verses listed above). Thus in certain sub-cultures in North America, for example, growing one’s beard long is an expression of mourning (remember "Forest Gump"?). This principle points the way to solve the dilemma mentioned by Samuel Rutherford in his discussion of the judicials cited below.

Larkin’s judgment here, then, is appropriate: "The Bible is unequivocal in proclaiming its own full authority. This means that in both form and meaning the teaching of Scripture is the authoritative standard for living, unless Scripture itself indicates otherwise" (Larkin 1992, 314; emphasis added). Larkin, thus, opts for the same reformational perspective that this dissertation’s neo-Puritan standard takes.

The Triadic Division as Hermeneutical Key

A basic problem in discovering the "equity" of the Mosaic judicials for transforming culture, is that of particularity and universality. That which is particular to the biblical cultures is obviously not binding upon all cultures (see Bahnsen’s point five above). However, that which is universal is binding upon all cultures. To that all would agree.

The WCF attempts to discern the eternal and transcultural from the cultural specific by dividing the Law into three parts: (1) Ceremonial Law, "all which are now abrogated under the New Testament"; (2) Judicial Law "sundry judicial laws which expired. . ., not obliging any other now, further than the general equity thereof may require." (3) Moral law "doth for ever bind all, as well justified persons as others. . . " (WCF 19, 3-5; emphasis added).

The Complete Moral Law is Universally Binding

On the surface, the WCF appears to claim that only the "Ten Words," engraved on stone, is permanent and abiding. However, they also state that the "general equity" of the judicials has also some permanent and binding normativity (note the words "may require"). Thus, the moral law cannot only and merely be the Ten Commandments and no more (see brief introduction in previous chapter).

Thus the confessional standards themselves seem to claim Ten Commandments is only a summary of the moral law exactly as the Westminster Larger Catechism, question 98 claims. Could this mean that the Ten Words sum up much of the moral law as codified in the judicials? The "general equity" of the judicials seem to be, in some way not completely defined, an integral part of the moral law. If this is so, then a deep cleavage of category between the permanent moral laws in the Ten Commandments and impermanent judicial law, is not supported by the WCF (nor the BC, art. 25).

Bahnsen and the Theonomist’s are convinced this is true. Concerning the essential unity yet functional distinction between the Ten Words and the judicials, Bahnsen writes:

This can be clearly seen in the sixth and seventh commandments. The Decalogue alone explicitly bans extra-marital intercourse. However, the divines clearly saw that the moral law condemning "adultery" stands in synecdoche for "adultery, fornication, rape, incest, sodomy, and all unnatural lusts; all unclean imagination, thoughts, purposes, and affections" and so forth (WLC, quest. 139). These things are condemned both in the New Testament and the judicials.

Secondly, the sixth commandment only forbids "murder," but does not define it. The word means to illegally kill someone. However, "you shall not illegally kill" is meaningless without a specific definition of what is illegal and legal killing. The case law gives that definition.

Bahnsen explains:

In other words, the Decalogue is the summary of the ten principles of moral law, the judicials (along with the prophets, poets, and New Testament books) are a specific cultural application of the moral law.

Speaking specifically of the judicial laws, Walter Kaiser states: "The precise specificness and particularity of the Bible was not meant to prejudice its universal usefulness, but to make the principle involved all the more concrete, real, and personal (Kaiser 1983, 42).

Moral/Ceremonial Cleavage Sharp, but not

the Cleavage between Moral/Judicial

Another problem in discovering universals in the Law is the explicit cleavage between Moral and Ceremonial taught throughout Scripture. Even a cursory look at the wisdom literature, the prophets and the apostles will see this distinction clearly taught.

However, the distinction between moral and civil-judicial law is not so simple. As seen in the previous chapter, Moses and the prophets apply the moral and moral-judicial law to the goyim within and surrounding the land (see again Lev 18:24-28, 20:22-24).

Furthermore, as seen in the Covenant Principle, the Decalogue, as a summary of the moral, is intimately connected with the judicials within the covenant structure. Thus, Scripture makes a distinction but not a sharp cleavage between the Decalogue and various types of judicials.

Theonomist, Greg Bahnsen, further clarifies this problem:

In other words, the ceremonial laws, usually quite easily distinguished (though not always), were perspicuous through definite contextual clues which relate them to the Israelite cultus, their ecclesiastic rites and the nation’s special symbolic-cultic "holiness." This the New Testament clearly says is replaced with the new cultus in Christ (see Heb. 8-10).

Second, as non-Theonomist Kaiser demonstrates, the distinction between moral and ceremonial law

Thus, though the Scripture itself sharply distinguishes between ceremonial and moral law, the distinction between moral and judicial law, however, is not as sharp. It seems clear that the Lord wanted His people to see that His moral law, summed up in the Ten Words, is to be the basis for their civil, social, family, economic and judicial areas of life.

God did not intend the universal principles in the apodictic and casuistic laws to be totally culturally particular and temporal. He intended them to be specific illustrations of God’s just, universal moral tôrâh applied to society, enclothed in the specific forms of the Hebrew culture.

Law must embody some God/god’s morality, whether that of Yahweh the King, the Demos as King or the Party, etc. There is no neutrality when teaching the peoples to do all things King Jesus-Yahweh has commanded (see Rushdoony 1973, 1-14).

General Equity as Hermeneutical Key

At this point it is necessary to recall again the introduction to the concept of "general equity" in the last chapter. Whether the definition of "general equity" by Theonomist’s such as Greg Bahnsen is similar to that of the Westminster divines is hotly debated (see e.g., Klein 1978, Jordan 1978-1979, Fowler n.d.; Neilands [1982], Pavlischek 1986, Ferguson 1990, Coldwell 1991, 1994; Bahnsen 1993b, Duncan 1993, Gordon 1994).

Meredith Kline’s classic, anti-theonomic article, however, is adamant that Bahnsen may have correctly interpreted the original confession but is certainly biblically wrong:

It is not the purpose of this chapter to solve this perplexing difficulty. However, Bahnsen is certainly correct to search for contextual clues within the original Confession to understand the proper meaning of the word’s "general equity." These can be found in the footnoted verses, supporting the words "general equity," in the section concerning the civil magistrate (chapter 23), and in the footnoted verses attached to the Larger Catechism’s discussion of the Ten Commandments.

Many times the divines cite the case laws in support of the duties or prohibitions logically implicit within the Ten Commandments, as we have seen previously. Thus, for example, the original Westminster Confession cites without question the Levitical standards on the prohibited marriage degrees as being valid today (WCF, 24.4, n. "h.") The WLC explains the meaning of the eighth commandment by insisting on restitution of things obtained illegally, citing a Mosaic judicial (Lev 6:2-5) and a New Testament example: Zaccheus (Lk 19:8). Thus the context of WCF and the WLC should define the words "general equity" before one seeks extra-confessional hints.

Second, the definition of sola Scriptura (WCF, 1.6-9) must be used to attempt to define what the divines meant. They held explicitly to the concept that all doctrines should be defined by Scripture alone. Scripture defines Scripture in the analogy of faith (WCF, 1.9). In other words, they were convinced that their doctrine of "general equity" must be defined and explicated by comparing Scripture to Scripture to be true and eternally valid.

Lastly, the divines included within their definition of sola Scriptura, the concept of "good and necessary consequence[s]" (WCF 1.6). This doctrine is necessary to discover implicit principles within and new applications of the Mosaic judicials for transforming modern ethno-cultures.

Using this as a biblical foundation, the confessional meaning of "general equity" can be further sharpened. First, however, other preliminary considerations need to be dealt with: (1) the definition of terms, (2) understanding something of the grappling of the Westminster Divines with the issue, (3) understanding of other Reformed scholars relatively contemporary to the Westminster Divines, (4) and briefly the question of the possibility of "equity" in the Mosaic penology.

Dictionary Denotations

The Oxford Dictionary provides possibly a key to understanding the connotation of the word "equity" in the Confession itself. Under the word "equity," point II. "In jurisprudence" it states: "Equity of a statute: the construction of a statute according to its reason and spirit, so as to make it apply to cases for which it does not expressly provide" (Oxford Dictionary 1970).

"General" in its turn, does not mean "vague," or "non-specific," as a more modern connotation of the word would suggest. The Confession must be read within its own context and cultural milieu. The word "general" then meant something very similar to "universal." Thus when the adjective "general" was used to denote a quality specific and distinct in itself, but also possessing universally applicability. In other words, something possessing "general" equity was not a principle merely parochial, or culturally specific (in this case to the Hebrew culture). It was equity valid in all cultures.

Thus the Oxford dictionary lists the following as meanings both of which apply to the Confession. It cites sources in the time period of the Confession:

Variations of Meaning of Term among Puritans and Contemporaries

Sinclair Ferguson, Systematics professor at Westminster Theological Seminary, has written an informative article on the concept of "general equity" of the Confession and on the various viewpoints of the commissioners concerning its meaning. He concludes that there was no monolithic viewpoint among the commissioners as to the meaning of "general equity."

Ferguson’s conclusion, with which this author substantially agrees, is that the Assembly’s wording allowed for a variety of perspectives, therefore the words do not demand "theoretical theonomy" such as Bahnsen insists (Bahnsen 1984). At the same time, however, he does admit that some of the commissioners’ viewpoints were perhaps close to Bahnsen’s.

What follows will be brief examples from some of the more prominent members of the Westminster Assembly or their immediate predecessors. These are men who also, like the first generation of Calvinists, seriously grappled with the contemporary relevance of the Mosaic judicials and the hermeneutical principles necessary for application to modern society.

The relevance of the Mosaic judicials was a hot issue for the original Puritans, on both sides of the Atlantic, and their Anglican foes. Anglican Archbishop William Whitgift asserted in his late sixteenth century debates with Puritans such as Thomas Cartwright that they seek to "abrogate all the existing laws of the land by substituting Mosaic laws for them" (Little 1984, 101).

Thomas Cartwright (1535-1603), perhaps the leading Puritan of his day, denies Whitgift’s charge outright:

In another section of his reply to Whitgift, Cartwright states that the magistrate is bound to the underlying moral-law core of each judicial, not necessarily the husk which changes from culture to culture:

Cartwright gives several hermeneutical principles for deriving the culturally universal "marrow" from the judicials. First of all, he states the Puritans did not desire to "cast away" the books of the common law, agreeing with Calvin’s sentiments. This was especially true in England with its common law so thoroughly Christianized because "they were already related to the moral law" (Little 1984, 103) and the judicials founded upon that law (see Lee 1989; Perks 1993). Laws against blasphemy, adultery, sodomy, bestiality, idolatry, and other violations of the moral law (or direct deductions from it), were already in place in English (and Roman-Dutch) common law.

Second, that the Puritans did not cast off the principles of "reason uncorrupt." By this he most certainly means not autonomous reason of the humanist but logic and deduction ("good and necessary consequence") founded squarely upon major premises derived from exegesis of Scripture itself (see WCF, 1.6).

Third, he defines "equity of the law" as coming first from the plain words of Moses and then upon sound reason, that is logical deductions therefrom.

Fourth, the external form of just laws may differ from those of the Pentateuch, yet they will never be "contrary" to them because of principle three. "Goodness" (by which he seems to mean the justice and truthfulness of laws) will never contradict itself even in two laws of diverse external wording or form.

In his opinion, except for the Sabbath law, the marrow, equity, and substance of the judicial laws did indeed couple the Mosaic punishment with violations of the whole Decalogue.

Church of Scotland commissioner to the Assembly, George Gillespie (1613-1648) agrees. Gillespie also couples the moral law to the judicial laws directly dealing with the Decalogue:

Furthermore, Wholesome Severity Reconciled with Christian Liberty (Gillespie 1645), an anonymous work which many attribute to Gillespie, discusses to what extent the "Christian magistrate is bound to observe the judicial law of Moses."

Yet he clearly saw that the Spirit of Christ would have "such judgment . . . be tempered with mercy under certain circumstances" (Ferguson 1990, 342), a perspective this dissertations affirms.

Note his conjoining of trespasses against the moral law with judicials which clearly explicate the scope of applicability of the moral command (enticing away from God, blasphemy, striking of parents). The temporal things in the judicials were those elements, exclusive to the Jewish state, which were clearly not applicable universally because they were tied to the land of Israel, the unique Jewish ethno-covenantal "holiness," and so forth.

Samuel Rutherford (1600-1661), Scots commissioner to the Westminster Assembly, also sincerely struggles with the issue of what is perpetual and what is temporary in the judicials. He was not entirely in harmony with his close friend Gillespie:

Rutherford does not give a systematically worked out doctrine of how to find that which is "moral and perpetual" in the case laws. Interestingly enough, each example Rutherford cites from the judicials as not binding today, except one, are either based on a non-creational form (trimming of hair, etc.) or on a judicial law which is closely interwoven with the temporary ceremonial, cultic and/or purity laws. The one exception is that of "the child that is stubborn to his parents."

Lastly, it must be noted that Rutherford did see much of binding continuity in the case laws regulating the civil magistrate. The magistrates of the commonwealth of Israel served as a clear precedent or paradigm for the modern Christian magistrates. His volume Lex rex (Rutherford 1645/1982) is full of examples from Moses, the histories, and prophets illustrating the rights of citizens; the covenant between rulers, God and the people; when to resist or to flee oppression, etc. (see "Samuel Rutherford and Puritan political theory" [Flinn 1978-1979]).

Sedgwick (1601-1643), brother of Obadiah Sedgwick, a member of the Westminster Assembly, wrote "Antinomianism anatomized, or a Glass for the lawless," to refute antinomianism. It serves as a convenient commentary of one interpretation of universal equity. Expounding Romans 3:31, using the familiar three fold division of the law, he first rejects the binding authority of the ceremonial law. Then he discusses the judicials:

He concludes that only the moral law is spoken of in the passage at issue as being established without qualification. This seems to be a conclusion imposed on the context, not exegeted from it. However, his definition of "common equity" "[universal] right" is valuable. "Common," a synonym for "general," equity was that in the judicials which "confirmed" any of the Decalogue, or upheld the good of the three divine, covenantal institutions, family, church, and state.

The great Synodical-Congregationalist Puritan, John Owen also had a strong opinion:

Owen gives good introductory principles, but the debate still rages over what is "proper to . . . the church and nation of the Jews." However, clearly he sees "something moral," in these institutions enclothed in Jewish "forms." He saw a much greater range of equity of the judicials than just penology.

Two Continental Contemporaries to the Divines

A Dutch scholar at about the time of the Assembly, Johannes Wollebius [Johan Wolleb], writes clearly concerning the three-fold distinction in the law including, what he calls, the "political" law. He introduces the topic: "So much for the ceremonial law. The political law dealt with the civil constitution of the Jews."

This serves as a succinct parallel to the Westminster Confession. Note the emphasis upon "the moral law and . . ordinary justice" as the two factors determining that which is cross-culturally valid in the judicials. "Ordinary justice" seems to be synonymous with "general equity," that sense of justice common to all nations. Since he separated this from the Decalogue ("moral law"), this seems to cover such principles as church-state relations, due process principles in courts, equal protection, and the like discussed in the judicials.

Proposition three is exactly parallel in concept to the words about the body politic of the Jews expiring. Lastly note his description of the political law as the "civil constitution of the Jews." Since the judicials cover all three divine institutions (family, church, and magistrate), he implies that the universally valid principles of justice in the political law serve as binding constitutional principles for all cultures.

Lastly, Francis Turretin, heir of Calvin’s leadership in Geneva and Professor of Theology at the Academy there also gives significant insight into the meaning of "general equity." He writes that there are three opinions concerning the abrogation of the judicial law. (1) The Anabaptists and Antinomians who "think it absolutely and simply abrogated as to all things." (2) "That law is still in force and should be retained and that Christian states are to be governed like the Jewish" (Turretin 1992, 2:166). This was, he states, the opinion of Andreas Karlstadt, Castellio, and Brochmann.

The reason both of these opinions are incorrect, he states, is two-fold. The first opinion causes "many moral things [to] . . . be abrogated which are contained in the forensic law." The second, because "many typical things would have to be observed which are most foreign to the reason of our times" (Turretin 1992, 2:166).

Having refuted the first two, Turretin claims that the "orthodox" position is that of the "middle ground." This position makes a careful distinction between that which is "abrogated" and "what is still in force," similar to the Westminster Divines (Turretin 1992, 2:166).

First of all, all things within the Jewish state which were a "type of the Kingdom of Christ" are "simply abrogated" because his Kingdom "has already come" (Turretin 1992, 2:166). Secondly, those things pertaining to the "good order" or "form of government of the Israelite people, it cannot be said to have been abrogated, unless relatively."

To explain this enigmatic statement, he makes a further distinction between those things in the law which were "of particular right" and those "which were of common and universal right." The first are those things "which particularly applied to the Jews in relation to time, place and Jewish nation." Here he mentions the Levirite law "concerning a husband’s brother, the writing of divorcement, the gleaning, etc." The second, are "founded upon the law of nature common to all (such as the laws concerning trials and the punishment of crimes, widows, orphans, strangers and the like, which are of moral and common right" (Turretin 1992, 2:166).

Turretin further explains this common right as still remaining because "it enters into the nature of the moral and perpetual law and was commanded to the Jews not as Jews simply, but as men subject with others to the law of nature" (Turretin 1992, 2:166). In other words, that law of the creation which God inscribed upon every man conscience from the beginning and which every man possesses, is the foundation of the universal right in the judicials. Note that this includes more than merely the principles of the Decalogue when he mentions due process rules and penology.

To this distinction, Turretin adds three principles to discover that which is universal in the law: (1) "That what prevails not only among the Jews, but also among the Gentile (following the light of right reason)." Thus the Gentiles had "their own laws in which are many things agreeing with the divine laws (which even a comparison of the Mosaic and Roman law alone, instituted by various persons, teaches)" (Turretin 1992, 2:166). (2) That which is conformed to the Decalogue and which "serves to explain and conform it" (Turretin 1992, 2:166-167). (3) Things which are repeated in the New Testament so that "their observance is commended to Christians" (Turretin 1992, 2:167).

Clearly, Turretin sees many of the judicials possess universal equity or "moral and common right." His main problem is that he fails to see how comparing biblical law to the law of nations allows Scripture to be the final judge and arbitrator of all moral, doctrinal, and legal truth. This seems to contradict Christ and Paul’s clear teaching on ethical continuity and that every Scripture is valuable for doctrine and training in justice (Mt 5:17-21; Ro 3:31; 1Ti 1:5-11; 2Ti 3:16-17).

Penology and Universal Equity

There is some disagreement among the Reformed and Puritan divines concerning the penalties of the judicial laws. This is true among contemporary neo-Puritans (as defined in the first chapter) as well. W. Kaiser (1983), C. Wright (1983), G. North (1990b), T. Longman (1990), V. Poythress (1991), J. Frame (1989), and J. Jordan (1988, 1989), for example, do not agree with Rushdoony and Bahnsen’s position demanding always mandatory execution for capital crimes.

Based on a key passage in Numbers (35:31) and several cross references, it seems that only in the case of pre-meditated murder (perhaps a few other crimes without a living victim) was/is the magistrate required to enforce the death penalty. In this case alone, he may not take a ransom from the criminal for the benefit of the victim (see Ex 21:22, 26-27 [ransom for injury]; Pr 7:34-35 [ransom for adultery]). The principle of "ransom" or "compensation" is a logical deduction from the "lex talionis" principle, equal justice for all with the punishment equivalent to the crime (see discussion in Government and Judicial Ethics in the Bible and Rabbinic Literature [Priest 1980,146ff]).

This was a great improvement over ancient vendetta practice or the common custom of differential penology depending on social class status of criminal and victim. Thus the wisdom of the Israelite tôrâh seems to have had inbuilt flexibility and compassion. The goal of the Tôrâh’s universal equity was restoration of a broken harmony and balance (shalom) and in no way was it harsh, unreasonable, and barbaric.

Victim’s Rights (North 1990b), has somewhat modified this thesis. He suggests that the living victim is the only one who can negotiate with the criminal before the magistrate for a monetary ransom for crimes committed against him or her. Thus, according to his thesis, only the victim, not the magistrate has the right to "impose" a lesser penalty than the maximum demanded in the law. The principle of the "goring ox" seems regulative for other cases: "If payment is demanded of him, he may redeem his life by paying whatever is demanded" (Ex 21:30) (see also The Death Penalty in the Mosaic Law. . . [Jordan 1989, 17-25]).

When a "ransom" or monetary payment (2Sa 21:1-14) is given by the criminal to the judge or the state to lessen a penalty, the various Hebrew terms must be translated "bribe" (compare Pr 6:35 with 21:14). Bribery results in tyranny, judicial fiat, injustice (Ex 23:8; Dt 16:19, 27:25). The result is the rule of men not a single, impartial, universally valid norm. However, when the court mandates that a victim receive damages, then a suitable translation is "ransom," the price of justice (Ex 21:30; Lev 1:4; Pr 6:35). This dissertation agrees.

To conclude, then, magistrates in the various ethno-cultures of the earth are held accountable by God not to be arbitrary or capricious in their judgment. They are to judge righteously and impartially (Dt 1:15-18, 16:18-20; Lev 19:15; Ps 82:1-4; Pr 24:23ff; Ro 13:1-4; 1Pe 2:14). Biblical equity commands equal protection of one law standard for all people (Lev 18:26-27, 24:22; Nu 15:15). Lastly, that standard is the same norm as the law inscribed in conscience (Ro 1:32; 2:1-15).

Therefore, according to an inbuilt principle of biblical covenantal law, only a living victim of a crime has the "right" to plead for a mitigation of sentence. This is a crucial reason why murder, contrary to Theonomy, is perhaps the only criminal act which merits an always mandatory death penalty.

Summary of Evidence and Conclusion

In summary, then, both the Belgic and the Westminster Confessions make a distinction between temporal and universal within the judicials. Note that the WCF does not state that the judicials as a whole were abolished at the cross like the ceremonial laws. The judicials as a complete, integrated system merely "expired" when the Israelite nation as a "body politick" ceased to exist, presumably in 70 AD This is self-evident. The laws concerning the cities of refuge, the division of the land, special holiness of the Levitical priesthood’s families, and so forth cannot now be applied outside of Canaan.

Thus, as Johannes Wollebius correctly states, there were some aspects of the judicials that were particular to Israel, that is "peculiar to that law and were prescribed for the promised land or the situation of the Jewish state" and some which possess principles of the moral law and common right (see also Bucer). These principles are those found in the Decalogue and the principles of sound reason and the law of nature. This seems to be the same as the "uncorrupt" principles of reason (Cartwright) showing the good order and form of government of Israel (Turretin). This order and form in Israel exposit the principles of common and universal justice (Turretin) and the universal good of family, church and commonwealth (Sedgwick). Owen, Gillespie, and also apparently Rutherford would agree.

The contrast which Wollebius, Turretin and the Westminster Divines, therefore, make is between that which is "particular" (local and provincial), and that which is "general" (universal, non-provincial, applicable to all peoples and nations). The contrast is not between "general" in the sense of "vague" and "ambiguous" versus "specific." This the Belgic and Westminster Catechisms constantly acknowledge. Except for the Sabbath penalties, they apply both the Ten Commandments and their judicial penalties to the contemporary sitz im leben (context). These are cited without question or interpretation as being perspicuously applicable to the present age.

The divines cited above, as well as Calvin and Bucer, give only a few specific hermeneutical keys, derived from Scripture itself, which distinguish between universally valid "equity" and that which is particular and temporal.

First is the helpful distinction between the temporal and universal in the law. The test of the "general" or "common" is first of all, that which is culturally universal. Second, it is that which conforms to both tablets of the Decalogue (the same as natural reason or natural law). Third, it is that which is repeated in the New Testament. Fourth, all three divine institutions (family, church, magistrate) come under the reign of Kingdom justice expressed in these judicial principles. However, this although a helpful beginning, it does not solve many problems. This is most frustrating. The principles which Turretin give, however, are a good start, especially his second and third principles.

It remained to this century, as Kaiser stated until the church has begun to examine again what exactly are the canons necessary to distinguish between the universal and parochial. This chapter’s neo-Puritan perspective seeks to be eclectic in discovering these canons or keys.

So far, the confessions and divines have taught that in the judicial case laws, there are universally valid, moral principle of charity, justice, evenhandedness, and universal rightness ("equity") which can be extracted from the cultural details and applied (contextualized) in every culture. These moral law principles are summarized under, but not exhausted by, ten categories in the ten commandments.

The twentieth century scholars, building on ancient insight, have added to this a further observation. The ten categories of the law are exposited in the Law of the Covenant (Ex 22-23), the middle section of Deuteronomy (chapters 6-26), the Law of the Covenant (Ex 22-23), and other sections in the Pentateuch. Thus each of these laws are universal, moral law foundation which cannot be merely ad hoc or arbitrary.

It seems, then, that a both modern and classical confessional insights are necessary to expound the judicials.

No Judicial Irrelevant, Some Aspects Temporal

First of all, no judicial is irrelevant but some aspects of each law may be temporal (2Ti 3:16). Turretin’s first and second principles, above, would corroborate this. James Jordan reaches a similar conclusion in "Calvinism and the ‘Judicial Law of Moses.’" He concludes that the phrase "general equity" in the Westminster Confession means that although the precise situations addressed by the case law are no longer found today, "there are parallel cases to which they do apply, and where these parallel cases are found, the case laws are binding" (Jordan 1978-1979, 39-40).

Moral Equity Interpreted by Prophets, Christ,

and New Testament

A second insight is that the moral equity of the judicials is interpreted by the Israelite prophets (including John the Baptist), by New Testament writers, and the very words of Christ Jesus Himself (e.g., Mt 5:17-21, 15:1-7). This conforms to Turretin’s third principle.

Four Levels of Abstraction in Biblical Law

Third, this author discerns four levels of abstraction within the biblical law’s own definition of sin and criminal behavior. These four levels, mentioned in the previous chapter, summarize the Universal Equity Principle and are exegetically derived (see Jordan 1984; Kaiser 1987). They seem to be implicit in the wording of the confessions themselves.

(1) "Love" is the heading-peg "upon which the Law and Prophets hang" Love is the capsulation or summary of the moral law defining sin and righteousness which, in turn, summarizes the Ten Commandments (Mt 23:40; 7:12; Ro 13:8ff; Gal 5:14ff; 1Ti 1:5-11; Jas 2:8ff).

(2) The Ten Commands summarizes the abiding principles of the moral law’s definition of sin. The Decalogue outlines what "love" looks like in thought, word, and deed (Ro 13:9-10).

(3) "General equity" or, in modern English, the universally applicable principles of justice and equity found in every law of Moses specifically flesh out the Decalogue’s outline. They are thus subpoints under the Ten Categories of moral law.

(4) Culturally Particular, non-creational forms bound to the now expired Jewish civil-political order and its culture.

The only culturally relative aspect of this whole four level system of summarization and application of the Mosaic law are the specific, Hebrew cultural forms in the fourth level.

Examples of these cultural details not tied to creation design are (1) ancient flat topped, versus the modern peaked house, construction; (2) threshing with oxen (versus machines); (3) death penalty through stoning versus hanging or by the sword (see Ro 13:4); (4) distinctive Hebrew male and female dress customs versus distinctively male and female modern clothing (Dt 22:5 - transvestitism being universally sinful); and so forth.

Walter Kaiser agrees with this "ladder of abstraction":

Bahnsen elaborates this principle:

Equity Defines Criminal Versus Sinful

Lastly, only the equity of the law of God can define that which is (1) criminal, meriting civil punishment and ecclesial discipline, and, (2) that which is sinful. That which is sinful can bring family and/or possibly church sanctions. That which is sinful will definitely bring divine chastisement (Ro 2:1-14). However, if not also simultaneously defined as criminal, sinful acts cannot be punished with civil sanctions when manifested.

The case laws or casuistic law, then, is necessary to define crime in the three, oath bound, covenantal governments: civil, ecclesiastical, and familial:

Final Definition of Universal Equity

The final test of all doctrine, training in justice and righteousness, and moral correction is Scripture not a human confession. There is no suggestion, however, that the following definition is the only one demanded by either the Belgic or Westminster confessions but merely that it falls within that which is allowed by the language of these standards. The author is convinced the following definition is what Scripture teaches.

That which is moral in the case laws is eternal. The morality of the law of God is based on (1) God’s creational design-norms which remain constant to the end (Jer 33:20-25; Mt 5:17ff), and (2) upon His character which is unchangeable: "

The "general [universal] equity" of the judicial law is, then, the moral law applied to concrete cases clothed in changing cultural details. Universal equity is the universally (i.e., cross culturally) valid principles of charity, moral justice, and impartial, even-handedness found in every judicial. These can be discovered by Scripture enlightened reason but are universally "suppressed" by the unregenerate mind (Ro 1:18-31).

This universal equity is transculturally valid. The Westminster Assembly, it seems, used the eight rules of question 99 of the WLC to discover this transcultural moral equity.

In addition, the civil penalties attached to the violations of at least the Ten Commandments (except the Sabbath law) is binding upon all cultures and every magistrate as the ultimate penalty. However, universal equity has built in principles of mercy and compassion for the victim so that many ultimate penalties can be commuted. According to the confessions discussed, thus, the magistrate, church, and family were to enforce both tablets of the law with different "tools" for enforcement.

In this wise and gracious enforcement, the culture-bound details in which the morality of the judicials were enclothed can be ignored. The culture bound details are those which can not be grounded in the creational design and the norms derived from that design as explained throughout the whole Scripture.

Wisdom and the administration of civil justice are closely connected in Scripture (Dt 1Ki 3:9-11 and 2Ch 1:10; Pr 8:12-16; Jas 3:13-18). Wisdom and the "righteous decrees and laws" of Moses are also closely coupled (see Dt 4:5-8; Ps 19:7-9; 119:97-104; Pr 24:23-29, 28:5). Thus wise administration of civil justice and the wise application of the universal and eternal in the decrees of Moses are closely intertwined.

This wise enforcement of the eternal equity of the law by the three covenantal governments has several purposes: (1) to restrain external wickedness, (2) to allow the gospel to be freely lived in every area of life including the socio-political order (1Ti 2:1-6), and (3) to keep society from being progressively hardened in lawless sin and rebellion against the proclamation of the gospel of grace (1Ti 2:3ff).

The whole purpose of the law, even the third or civil-political use of the law, was to drive individuals, families, and socio-cultures to the feet of Christ’s gospel of grace (Ro 2:17-27; 3:19-20; 7:7-25; 10:1-4; 1Ti 1:5-11). He is making all His enemies either His Sons and Friends, or the footstool under His feet: "The execution of justice is joy for the righteous, but is terror to the workers of iniquity" (Pr 21:15 NASB).

David Little summarizes the representative perspective of the Elizabethan Puritan, William Perkins: "[The magistrate’s] . . . essential task is to drive men in the direction of election, toward a conscience and will that are voluntarily obedient to God" (Little 1984, 126). This is biblically and confessionally correct if held within biblical limits.